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Abstract 
 
The dissertation is a study of the human element in collision at sea; both the human 
elements that may be involved in maritime collisions and the countermeasures that are 
applicable in reducing the involvement of those human elements are identified and 
analyzed. 
 
The meaning of the phrases “human error”, “human factors”, and “human element” in 
the context of maritime system are differentiated based on the comparison of the 
definitions proposed by various researchers and organizations. Thereby the application 
scope of “human element “ is defined for the purpose of the dissertation. 
 
The commonly used human element classifications are examined. Based on these 
examination, a new human element classification for storing and gathering the human 
element data in maritime collision is proposed, taking into account of the direct causes, 
the underlying causes, and the external influencing factors leading to collision at sea. 
 
The human element involved in collision at sea are identified by two approaches: in one 
hand, existing written accident reports are analyzed and the human elements involved in 
these accident cases are picked up; in the other hand, seafarers and exports’ view on the 
human elements involved in marine collisions are interviewed by questionnaires. A 
comparison between the results get from the two approaches is made. Mathematical 
tools such as fuzzy sets have been used in dealing with the data collected by 
questionnaires. 
 
Faced with the identified human elements, countermeasures against these elements are 
examined, taking into account of the measures recommended by researchers, 
organizations, and seafarers. 
 vii
 
The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings concerning the identified human 
elements, countermeasures, and the approaches used in the study. A number of 
recommendations are made relating to the need for further research in the subjects. 
 
KEYWORDS: Human element; collision at sea; accidents; maritime investigation; 
countermeasures; classification. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 . Background 
 
According to maritime accident statistics, the collision is one of the most significant 
casualties occurring at sea (IMO, 1997; Lloyd’s Register of shipping, 1997, p.16). 
Collision avoidance has been a hot topic in the maritime industry since the 19th century. 
The work on collision avoidance has mainly focused on three areas: establishing 
regulations and strengthening traffic control; improving and enhancing the technical 
level of seafarers; studying and promoting collision avoidance automation (Zhao, Wu & 
Wang, 1992). Examples of the achievements resulting from these efforts are: the 
adoption of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea; the 
establishment of a vessel traffic management system; the use of radar and ARPR. 
However, accidents, including collisions, still occur at a high rate every year; even when 
competent navigators are controlling the ship (Gray, 1996,4; IMO, 1997). So, what is 
still the matter? 
 
It is the human element that plays a main part in maritime accidents. Research into the 
maritime casualty area reveals that 96% of all collisions were attributable to the human 
element (MAIB, 1991, p.4; UK P&I Club, 1999; Grime, 1996, p.260). Kuo’s (1998, 
p.108)’s study concluded that 60% of all accidents are directly caused by human error, 
while a further 30% accidents have the human element as indirect contributory cause.  
 
The human element as involved in maritime casualties, including collisions, has 
attracted much concern from all parties in the maritime industry. Researchers from 
various countries especially from Europe and the USA have done a great deal of work 
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on this matter. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), as an inter-
governmental organization, has played an active and leading role in human element 
research work. It coordinates and harmonizes the research activities among member 
States.  
 
Research on the human element covers quite a wide scope. The major emphases of these 
research include: the classification of human and organization errors; the systematic 
survey of factors influencing crew performance; data gathering and analysis relating to 
human factors; method of improving man-ship interface; system failures; the 
management of human element; and quality and reliability of human element (Kuo, 
1998, p.109; Moore & Bea, 1995, p.184; Williams, 1994; Eriksson & Mejia, 2000, p.8; 
IMO, 1997).  
 
Research on the human element as involved in collisions has a long history. Indeed, 
research on the human element in collisions at sea may be traced back to the collection 
of statistics of accidents at sea in the mid 18th century (Smeaton, Morton, & Dineley, 
1996, p.260). The achievement of these accident statistics is the outcome of the 
International Rules of the Road at Sea which is still the basis of the current International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (Cockcroft & Lameijer, 1996, xiv). 
However, the intensive study of the human element involved in collisions was started at 
the end of the 1980s when IMO shifted its attention to the human element in maritime 
casualties. 
 
 The research in this field mainly focused on three aspects: the investigation of collision 
causes (Drager, Kristiansen, Karlsen & Wrencke, 1981, p.22; Cahill, 1997); risk analysis 
(Hinsch, 1995, p.389; Wennink, 1992, p.80); and watch keeper collision avoidance 
behaviour (MSA, 1995; James, 1994, p.259; Zhao, Price, Wilson & Tan, 1995, p.425; 
Zhang, 1998). Considerable progress has been made: some frequently occurring unsafe 
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acts in collisions have been roughly identified; collision risk incorporating human 
factors has been estimated quantitatively; navigators’ customary behavior in collision 
avoidance has been mathematically modeled. This progress has made a great 
contribution to collision avoidance and promoted safety at sea. 
 
However, very little is known about the human element and the reasons why mistakes 
are made (O’Neil, 1996, p.4). Poor look out, failure to comply with regulations and 
fatigue are causes leading to collisions (Smeaton, Moreton & Dineley, 1996, p.260; 
Cahill, 1997, p.229). But, what caused the fatigue? Why is a navigator negligent when 
on look out? These questions need to be answered. Only when the underlying human 
elements leading to the unsafe acts in collisions are identified, can proper 
countermeasures against these errors be made. 
 
1.2. Objectives 
 
• Identify the human elements involved in collisions at sea. 
• Identify the measures for reducing the impact of the human element in collisions 
at sea. 
 
1.3. Methodology 
 
The method used in this dissertation consists of the following steps: 
• Constructing a classification for collecting and storing the data of human 
elements involved in collisions at sea. 
• Gathering data of human elements involved from various sources especially from 
current written accident reports. 
• Interviewing maritime safety related persons using questionnaires. 
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• Establishing a mathematic model for data analysis. 
• Analyzing the information from written accident reports and questionnaires. 
• Identifying the human element involved in marine collisions. 
• Identifying the measures for reducing the human element involvement on the 
basis of identified human element and perspectives of related parties. 
 
1.4. Dissertation structure 
 
Chapter 1 provides the background and problem definition for the research. Seven steps 
of methodology describing the scope of the dissertation are defined. 
 
Chapter 2 provides the definitions for the terms “human element” and “maritime 
system”; there is an attempt to clarify the difference between such phrases as “human 
element”, “human factor”, and “human error”.  The human elements frequently observed 
in marine collisions are also presented on the basis of the current maritime accident 
statistics reports. 
 
Chapter 3 proposes a classification for storing the human elements involved picked up 
from written accident reports. Some currently used classifications are reviewed. 
 
Chapter 4 analyses the information and data gathered from written accident reports and 
questionnaires. Some most significant human elements involved in collisions are 
identified or confirmed. 
 
Chapter 5 reviews the existing measures for human element reduction, and analyses the 
measures proposed by respondents of questionnaires. Based on this analysis, some 
recommendations on the reduction of human elements involvement are made. 
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Chapter 6 is a conclusion for the whole dissertation.  
 
Referred literature and written accident reports, blank questionnaires, and original data 
for analysis are found in the Appendices.     
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CHAPTER 2 
Human Elements in Collision at Sea 
 
 
What does “human element” mean? When a glance is thrown on a piece of literature or 
document dealing with the safety and casualty, phrases such as “human element”, 
“human factor” and “human error” will get into your sight. Even in the same paper, 
these terms are often used alternatively. The mixed use of these phrases leads to the 
reader’s confusion on their meaning. For the purpose of this dissertation, a better 
understanding of the terms “human element”, “human factor”, and “human error” is 
needed. 
 
Chapter 2 is devoted to defining and clarifying the meaning of “human element” in 
maritime systems. Based on the comparison of their meaning and the application scope, 
definitions for “human element”, “human factors”, “human errors” are proposed 
respectively. The components of human element implicated in maritime systems are 
explored. Human errors frequently observed in ship collisions are roughly examined 
based on the casualty statistics. Finally, based on the proposed maritime system, the 
scope of the human element to be discussed in this dissertation is defined. 
 
2.1. Defining the human element, human factor and human error  
 
The phrases “human element”, “human factor”, and “human error” are increasingly used 
in literature in particular when it is associated with human performance and safety. 
Some writers use them alternatively without any differentiation in the same paper. They 
mean the same thing, human failure, with any of these three terms. Indeed, they have 
different meanings in different uses. 
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2.1.1. Human error 
 
The term “human error” has a longer history than the other two phrases. It can be traced 
back to 1931 when it had its birth with Heinrich (Petersen, 1996,xiii). It was introduced 
as a “people problem” into the causation sequences. Since then, human error has been 
recognized as a basic cause behind all accidents and incidents. What does “ human 
error” mean? Peters (1966) defined it from three aspects: 
In theory, … human error consists of any significant deviation from a 
preciously established, required or expected standard of human performance. 
 
In practice, term may have any one of several specific meanings depending 
upon the nature of contractual agreement, the unique requirements of a 
particular program, the customary error classification procedures… and the 
emotional connotations involved with the use of a term which might be 
incorrectly perceived as possibly placing the blame on individuals or their 
immediate supervision. 
 
In the reality of situation where arguments of precisely what is or is not a 
human error are of less importance that what can be done to prevent them. 
 
J. Reason (1990; 1997,61) defined “human error” as “the failure of planned action to 
achieve their desired ends –with out the intervention of some unforeseeable event.” 
 
Rothblum (1996) described the human error as “ an incorrect decision, an improperly 
performed action or an improper lack of action /inaction”. 
 
A definition given by IMO (2000e) is: 
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“A departure from acceptable or desirable practice on the part of an 
individual or group of individuals that can result in unacceptable or 
undesirable results.” 
Whichever of these definitions you prefer, they all convey such an impression that 
“human error” is the failure of planned human performance which can result in 
unacceptable or undesirable results. The focus is lighted on the failure of human actions. 
 
2.1.2.  Human factor 
 
Comparing with the term “human error”, human factor is a neutral phrase. It may have 
several meanings depending on the area it applies to. It may be used as a discipline under 
the title “ergonomics”; thus, it means “the scientific study of man in his working 
environment ” as defined by Stockbridge (1975). In other case, it may means “human 
engineering” when talking about man-machine interface in the application of computers 
(Kuo, 1993, p.639). 
 
In the context of the safety of maritime systems, “human factors” covers “a wide range of 
elements involves in the interaction between individuals and their working environment 
(Feyer & William, 1998, p.56.9), the phrases “human factors” means (UK Health and 
Safety Executive, 1989): 
 
The perceptual, mental and physical capabilities of people and the interaction 
of individuals with job and working environments, the influence of equipment 
and system design on human performance, and, above all, the organizational 
characteristics, which influence safety, related behaviour at work. 
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Kuo (1993) pointed out “the term ‘human factors’ is concerned with the interfacing of a 
set of personal capabilities and characteristics with a combination of hardware, software, 
working environment and operational culture in the effective performance of a task” 
 
Both the above-quoted definitions cover the human beings’ capabilities, jobs and working 
environment, the effects of system designs on human performance and organizational 
characteristics. The later one even treats the above-mentioned factors into two distinct 
groups. Gordon (1998,p.97) quoted Wilpert’s “human factors” definition as 
“organizational group and individual factors”. Apparently, the term “human error” only 
shows human factors’ negative sides. 
 
2.1.3. Human element 
 
Comparatively speaking, the term “human element” is much “younger” than the term 
“human error” and “human factor”. It was not frequently used until the end of the 1980s, 
when a research report, submitted by the UK government (Marine Directorate of 
Department of Transportation, 1991) to IMO, claims that “the human element was found 
to be present in over 90 percent collisions and groundings, and in over 75 of contacts and 
fires/explosions”. 
 
The UK report (Marine Directorate of department of Transportation, 1991) questioned the 
use of the term “human error” such as 80-90 percent of all accidents are caused by 
“human error” as misleading. It was not accurate. They thought that since human beings 
were popularly treated as just one system component amongst many others, and “human 
error” thus was an example of component failure. “Human factor” and “human element” 
were better alternatives. They stated further that both “human element” and “human 
factor” “can be used quite flexibly without necessarily imputing any sense of failure or 
transgression”.  
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Here, some important information is conveyed. First, human beings are treated as a 
component of a system. In this system, there are still some other components. So the term 
“human element” may be used to refer to human beings’ functions and performances in 
the system. Second, “human error” is only an example of human elements’ failure in the 
system. Third, “human element” has the similar meaning to “human factor”. 
 
IMO (1997a) interpreted the meaning of the term “human element” as “a complex 
multidimensional issue that affects maritime safety and marine environmental protection”; 
it “involves the entire spectrum of human activities performed by ship’s crew, shore-
based management, regulatory bodies, recognized organizations, shipyards, legislator, 
and other relevant parties”. 
 
Based on the discussion above, it could be concluded that the terms “human error”, 
human factor” and “human element” sometimes may be used to refer to the same issues 
associated with maritime safety. They have different meaning more or less but “human 
element” emphasizes more on the “function of human being as a “component” of a 
system. When discussing the issues of maritime system, it is better to use “human 
element”. “Human error” is only one dimension of “human element”: human failure. To 
decrease its occurrence possibility is the aim of consideration of human element matters. 
 
2.2. Human elements in maritime systems 
 
As mentioned above, human element is a component of a system. For the task of 
exploring the impacts of human elements involved in ship collisions, it is necessary to 
identify all human elements involved in the system. 
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2.2.1. Maritime system 
 
A system may be defined as “an organizational array of components designed to 
accomplish a particular objectives according to plan”(Clench, 1995,p.195). The system 
approach can offer a framework within which the human element may be put in context 
(Drager et al, 1981, p.23; Gu, 1992, p.5; Rothblum, 1996,). 
 
Gu (1992, p.5) established a maritime safety system with three subsystems: operator, ship 
and environment. The relationships among the three subsystems are shown in Figure 2. 
Apparently, this system is structured from the point of view of the ship operator. 
Figure 2.1 Relationship among operator, environment and ship 
Source: (Gu, 1993) 
 
Drager’s (1981, p.23) system also consists of three subsystems: ship, society and 
environment. In this system, ship refers to the following components: technical 
equipment and system, crew organization on board ship, and man machine 
communication. The subsystem of a society covers a very wide scope including owners, 
 
Operator Control Ship Ship  motion 
Position, state, and speed 
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Physical 
disturbance
G 
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Achieve 
Goal 
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shipbuilders, maritime administrators, education, health authorities, and classification 
society. (See Figure 2.2.) 
Figure 2.2 Illustration of project 
Source: Drager, 1981 
 
Rothblum (1996) stated that the maritime system is a people system (as shown in Figure. 
2.3). People interact with technology, the environment and organizational factors. In this 
system people include the ship’s crew, pilots, dockworkers, vessel traffic service 
operators and others. Environment includes weather environment, physical work 
environment and the regulatory and economic climates. Technology refers to the design 
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of the ship and the equipment of the ship that may have some kind of impact on people’s 
performance. Organization refers to crew organization and company policies. 
 
Each of these system structures has its characteristics. Some of them cover a wider scope, 
but people (operator, man), ship, and environment are common components they contain. 
 
2.2.2. Human elements involved 
 
In the maritime system established by Rothblum (1996), people related human elements 
include knowledge, skill, abilities, memory, motivation and alertness; the effects of 
technology on people include perception, decision-making, and performance. The effects 
of the environment on people include physical and mental performance, fatigue, risk-
taking; the organization on people includes fatigue, knowledge & skill, work practices, 
teamwork, and risk-taking. Among all these factors, the three largest problems were 
fatigue, inadequate technology knowledge, and inadequate communication and 
coordination between pilot and bridge crew (USCG, 1995). 
 
Clench (1995) identified 9 kinds of human elements in the maritime system: training, 
work load, fatigue, manning, selection, language, management, knowledge, and 
automation. These elements are further grouped into four categories: competency, 
organization and methods, design, and communication. 
 
Kuo (1993, p.640) incorporated the following human elements into safety systems: 
personal capabilities including both intellectual capabilities and physical capabilities; the 
influence of personal characteristics (such as personality, response to stress, attitude and 
leadership and teamwork qualities) on performance; the influence of hardware, software, 
and the working environment on human beings’ performance; and the impact of the 
operational culture on human beings’ behaviour. 
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Figure 2.3 the Maritime System 
Source: Rothblum, 1996 
 
Clearly, the human elements commonly identified in maritime system by these 
researchers are people abilities and limitations, the influences of environment, hardware, 
software, and organization on people. 
 
 
2.3. Frequently observed human element in ship collisions 
 
What are the most frequently observed human elements present in collision? As a start of 
this research, some statistical data are quoted as the following: 
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After an indepth analysis on twelve selected collisions, the Marine Directorate of the 
Department of Transports (1991) reported that the following human elements or human 
errors are frequently present: 
Carelessness/ overconfidence 7 
Lack of attention 6 
Communication failure 5 
Lack of knowledge 3 
Excessive speed in poor visibility 3 
Sheer interaction between ships 2 
Steering failure 2 
 
Dragger et al (1981) analysed the collision accidents involving Norwegian ships for the 
period 1970-1978. The results revealed that external conditions and “navigational error” 
are of high significance in collision accidents. For vessels above 1599tgr, the result of the 
statistics is:  
External conditions 26.8% 
Technical failure 6.6% 
Inadequate navigational factors 4.1% 
Navigational error 17.1% 
Non-compliance 6.8% 
Other ship 38.5% 
 
The Transportation Accident Investigation Commission (TAIC) of New Zealand’s (2000) 
statistical overview on accidents that happened during 1998-1999 demonstrates that the 
largest single human factors which was a cause of the accidents was error of judgement. 
The following is a list, which shows the occurring frequency of each kinds of causing 
factors: 
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Error of judgement 
Lack of knowledge 
Improper watch-keeping 
Failure to comply with regulation 
Ship handling 
Failure to obtain ships position and course 
Drug & alcohol 
Misconduct or negligence 
Physiological 
Overloading 
Fatigue 
Adverse weather 
Adverse current 
Mechanical failure 
Inadequate maintenance 
Other 
90 
71 
53 
22 
15 
13 
9 
8 
4 
3 
1 
56 
6 
26 
12 
37 
 
The Australia Marine Incident Investigation Unit (MIIU) (1996) analysed 8 collision 
cases and got the present frequency of human factors as the following: 
Poor or no lookout 
Poor passage plan 
Change of watch 
Incorrect lights 
Unqualified person 
Rough weather 
No radar reflectors 
8 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
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The Japan Marine Accident Inquiry Agency (JMAIA, 1999) made a review on collision 
cases from 1994 to 1998 and found that 12 human elements were frequently present in 
collisions: 
 
Improper lookout 410 
Non-compliance with 
Steering and sailing rules 
194 
Failure to sound signals 89 
Improper commercial & sequence of Duties 71 
Improper selection of speed 45 
Improper reporting or hand over 36 
Failure to post lights and /or shapes 30 
Dozing off 22 
Improper ship handling 9 
Improper ship operational control 6 
Insufficient consideration to weather 30 
Failure to check ships position 1 
 
 
Based on the above quoted statistical data from various sources, a brief conclusion on 
human elements in collisions may be made. The most frequently observed human errors 
are  
• Improper or poor lookout 
• Non-compliance with COLREGS 
• Error of judgement  
• Lack of knowledge 
• Unsafe speed in restricted visibility 
• Failure to sound and post signals 
 18
 
It is necessary to point out that most of those revealed human elements are unsafe acts 
committed by front-line crews. For the purpose of reducing their future occurrence, the 
underlying contributors to collision behind those unsafe acts are needed to be explored. 
 
2.4. Proposing structure of maritime safety systems and application of 
“human element” 
 
2.4.1. Structure of maritime safety system 
 
As mentioned above, each of the quoted structures of maritime systems has its scope of 
application. For the purpose of identifying human elements in collisions, a new maritime 
system structure is proposed as shown in Figure. 2.4. 
 
In establishing the structure of a maritime system, the components such as operator, ship 
environment and society are considered. Accident occurrence has also been included into 
the system structure. If safe measures or defences are broken, the ship will proceed into 
an accident. 
 
Operator mainly refers to crewmembers, pilots, and even VTS operators who directly 
conn the ship. 
 
Society mainly includes the ship owner, the shipbuilder, the administrator, the 
classification society, and the international organization. Organizational culture is 
included in this category. 
 
Environment refers to the external climate and traffic situation such as adverse weather 
condition, visibility, fairway condition, and other ships. 
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Figure 2.4 Maritime System 
 
The ship itself is also a subsystem; it includes the ship equipment, ship hull, ship 
maintenance, ship manoeuvrability, and also the operating environment it provides to the 
operator.   
 
2.4.2. Application of “human element”  
 
Taking into account of the characteristic of marine collision, the human element to be 
explored in this dissertation mainly focuses on the unsafe acts of operators, and the 
underlying contributors such as the operators’ personality that have a deep influence on 
the operator’s performance. The external elements including the environment, the society 
and ship itself that have a direct contact with operators will also be deemed as one aspects 
of the human element. The detail of these human elements will be discussed in chapter 3-
classification. 
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2.5. Summary 
 
The light of this Chapter is thrown on defining the term “human element”, “human 
factors” and “human errors”, exploring frequently observed human elements in collisions, 
and proposing the structure of a maritime system, for the purpose of setting the scope of 
“human element” to be studied in the following chapters. 
 
The meaning of the term “human element” covers a wider scope than the term “human 
error”. “Human element” represents a component of maritime system while “human 
error” is only an example of human failure in the system. 
 
Frequently observed human element present in collisions are poor lookout, error of 
judgement, non-compliance of regulations, selection of unsafe speed and lack of 
knowledge. Strictly speaking, most of these revealed human elements by accident 
investigation report can only be called “unsafe act” of front-line operators. To reduce the 
future occurrence of those unsafe acts, underlying contributors to collisions should be 
explored. 
 
The proposed structure of a maritime system mainly consists of operators, ship society, 
and external environment. Based on this maritime, the human element to be studied in the 
dissertation will limited to the unsafe acts, navigators personal characteristics, and the 
external influencing factors from society, natural environment and ship’s own operating 
environment  
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CHAPTER 3 
Classification of Human Elements in Collisions at Sea 
 
The focus of this chapter is to develop a classification framework for systematically 
identifying and characterizing human elements involved in collisions at sea. For this 
purpose, various human element classifications used in different accident reports and 
databases will be reviewed. Some literature about human elements will be studied 
and references will be made to IMO documents about human element investigations. 
Based on this study and analysis, a practical and compatible classification for 
identifying the human elements involved in collision will be proposed. 
 
3.1. Existing marine collision related human element classification 
 
The human element classification is commonly used in marine casualty database and, 
accident reports, and casualty statistical reports. For the purpose of this Chapter, the 
human element classification used in casualty database and casualty statistical 
reports will be reviewed. 
 
3.1.1. Human element classification used in marine casualty database 
 
Two typical human element classifications are introduced in this section: MAIB 
Human element classification and CASMAIN human error class. 
 
3.1.1.1 MAIB Human Element Classification for Marine Accidents 
 
The classification of Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) of UK (Gorden, 
1998, p.100) classifies the human elements into 6 subcategories: external bodies 
liaison; company and organization; crew factors; equipment; working environment; 
and individual (See table 3.3.1). Each subcategory includes some human elements, 
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which have similar natures. Some elements such as communication, training, skill 
and knowledge appear in different categories repeatedly, but they have different 
concerns in different subcategories. Take “communication” for example, it may 
mean the communication between the company and crew, the communication 
between external bodies and crew, the communication between crew and crew, the 
communication between external bodies and the company and so on.  
 
Table 3.1 MAIB Human Factors Classification Summary 
External Bodies Liaison                     
a. Non compliance                                  
b. Communication                                        
c. Equipment design-manufacturer         
d. Training, skills, knowledge        
e. Working environment/workplace        
f. Incorrect installation/defective         
Equipment                                          
Crew factor 
a. Communication                         
b. Management and supervision       Inadequate     
c. Allocation of responsibility              
Inappropriate                                      
d. Procedures inadequate       
e. Manning (rotation / watches)  
f. Training                                             
g. Discipline crew/passengers                            
h. Unsafe working practice 
Working environment                           
Performance affected by:                             
a. Noise              
b. Vibration   
c. Temperature   
d. Humidity        
e. Visual environment/visibility   
f. Ship movement weather effects      
g. Poor housekeeping    
h. Layout unsuitable for task   
i. Accommodation            
 
Company &Organization   
a. Company standing orders inadequate 
insufficient, conflicting etc. 
b. Manufacture’s instructions 
c. Communication  
d. Pressures- organizational    
e. Inadequate resources  
f. Training, skill, knowledge                     
Equipment   
a. Equipment misuse      
b. Equipment not available as needed  
c. Equipment poorly designed for                     
operational use  
d. Equipment badly maintained  
e. Personnel unfamiliar with equipment/not 
trained in use   
f. Automation means crew not trained 
in use of manual alternatives                               
Individual                              
a. Communication  
b. Competence & skill 
c. Training/inexperience, knowledge  
d. Violates procedures 
e. Health                                                        
drugs/alcohol                                                
medical condition  
f. Domestic issues  
g. Fatigue and vigilance  
h. Perceptual abilities 
i. Poor decision making/ information use 
j. Perception of risk  
k. Workload  
Source: Gorden, 1998, p.100 
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3.1.1.2 CASMAIN human error classification 
 
Table 3.2 CASMAIN human error classifications 
Bypass available safety devices Inattention to duty 
Intoxication (alcohol-drugs) Calculated risk  
Carelessness Error in judgment 
Lack of experience Lack of training  
Lack of experience Operator error 
Fatigue Smoking 
Open flame  Stress 
Physical impairment Psychological impairment 
Failed to comply with rules, regulations or 
procedures 
Inadequate supervision 
 
Improper casualty control program Improper safety precautions 
Failed to account for current weather  Failed to account for tide  
Failed to use available navigation equipment Failed to ascertain position 
Failed to use charts and publications Failed to use radio telephone 
Relied of floating aid to navigation Failed to yield right way 
Failed to establish passing agreement  Failed to keep to right of channel 
Failed to proceed at safe speed Failed to stop 
Failed to keep proper lookout  Improper faulty lights-shapes 
Improper missing whistle signal Improper maintenance  
Used defective equipment Design criteria exceeded 
Service condition exceeded Improper loading  
Preventative maintenance not done Improper cargo storage 
Improper securing- rigging  Improper mooring –towing 
Inadequate fire fighting equipment  Inadequate lifesaving equipment  
Inadequate controls Inadequate displays 
Inadequate statutory-regulation requirements Inadequate owner-operator 
Inadequate owner-operator safety program Inadequate manning  
Source: Dynamic Research Corporation, 1989 
 
The marine casualty database (CASMAIN) (Dynamic Research Corporation, 1989) 
is a database which was developed by the USCG to document both vessel and 
personnel casualties. It consists of two categories: Nature and Cause. The Nature 
categories include collisions, disappearances, explosions, fires, groundings, and 
material failure. Under each of these subcategories, some more detailed descriptions 
are provided. Take collision for example. Under these subcategories, two headings 
are provided: Meeting Situation and Objects. Meeting situation includes head-on 
meeting, overtaking, and cross meeting. Object means something that the ship 
collides with. It includes ice, aid of navigation, submerged object, floating object, 
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fixed object, dike, lock, bridge, dock, pier, and dam etc. The Cause category provides 
the reasons for each nature(event) of accident. Table 3.2 shows the Cause category 
called “the human and organizational error classification” used in the CASMAIN. 
 
3.1.2.  Human element classification used in marine casualty statistical reports 
 
There are a lot of kinds of marine casualty statistical reports that have mentioned 
more or less about human elements. In this section, only the human element 
classifications used in TAIC’s maritime statistical overview and JMAIA’s statistical 
reports are reviewed for they introduce the human elements in a more systematic way.  
 
Table 3.3 New Zealand TAIC’s Classification of Factors Involved in Marine 
Accidents 
Human factors Environment factors Technical factors 
• Error of judgement 
• Lack of knowledge 
• Improper watch 
keeping or lookout 
• Failure to comply 
with regulation 
• Ship handling 
• Failure to obtain 
ship’sposition or 
course 
• Other 
• Drugs and alcohol 
• Misconduct or 
negligence 
• Physiological 
overloading 
• Fatigue 
• Adverse weather 
• Submerged object 
• Adverse current 
• Other 
• Debris 
• Navigation 
hazard 
• Ice 
• Lighting 
 
 
• Mechanical 
failure 
• Other 
• Inadequate 
Maintenance 
• Electrical failure 
• Wear and tear 
• Structural 
failure 
• Corrosion 
• Steering failure 
• Inadequate 
stability 
• Insufficient fuel 
• Improper 
welding 
• Inadequate 
firefighting/lifes
saving 
equipment 
 
Source: TAIC of New Zealand. (2000) 
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3.1.2.1 TAIC Maritime Statistical Overview 
 
New Zealand Maritime Accident Investigation Commission (MAIC) classified the 
Causes of accidents into three main types: Human, Technical and Environmental 
(Maritime Safety Authority of New Zealand, 2000). Under the heading of human 
factors, about eleven human elements are listed; most of them are direct causes of 
collisions at sea. 
 
3.1.2.2 JMRI and JMAIA ’s classification of Causes of Marine Accidents 
 
The Maritime Research Institute of Japan (JMRI) identified 26 kinds of accident 
causes and classified them into eight major division (Nagatsuka, Seiji, 1993,) such as 
sub-standard ship operation control, sub-standard ship-handling, non-compliance 
with navigation rules, lack of due attention to weather conditions, imperfections of 
equipment and instruments, improper handling of machinery and tools, inadequate 
operation by seamen, and force majeure as shown in Table 3.6. Obviously, most of 
these divisions are connected with the human element except force majeure. The 
Marine Accidents Inquiry Agency of Japan’s (JMAIA) accident statistical report 
(1999) did not make any kind of sub-division, but put all these phrases in the same 
column with some phraseology adjustment and thus make the phrase more like those 
used by seaman (See table 3.4). 
 
3.1.3 Comments 
 
The reviewed classifications, both in database and in statistical reports, provide a  
basis for establishing statistical model for analysing human elements. Each of them 
has its characteristics. The classification used in database includes more elements 
and is more systematic. It is used to gather and store the human element data not only 
for collision but also for other kinds of maritime casualties. The classification used in 
statistical reports is easier to be understood for the phrases used in it are closer to 
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seamanlike words than that in databases. So it is widely accepted by those work in 
front-line. 
Table 3.4  MAIA’s Classification of Causes of Marine Accident 
Major division                          Sub-division 
Sub-standard ship 
operation control 
Inadequate ship operation control; 
Improper preparations for departure; 
Improper selection of waterway and non-stability of the ship’s course 
Sub-standard 
shiphandling  
Inadequate shiphandling ; 
Non –confirmation of the ship’s position 
Less alertness to lookout; dozing 
Non-compliance with 
navigation rules 
Not carrying lights and shapes; 
Failure to blow sound signals; 
Non-compliance with Law for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea; 
Regulations, and Mode of Navigation 
Lack of due attention 
to weather condition 
Lack of due attention to weather and sea phenomena; 
Inadequate anchorage and mooring; 
Inadequate measures for storm 
Imperfections of 
equipment and 
instruments 
Imperfections of the structures of hulls and engines, and of the materials 
used; improper maintenance and handling of steering equipment and 
instruments  
Improper handling of 
machinery and tools 
Improper maintenance, inspection and handling of main engines;  
Improper maintenance, inspection and handling of auxiliary engines; 
Improper inspection and handling of fuel oil and lubrication oil; 
Improper inspection and handling of electric equipment  
Inadequate operation 
by seamen 
Non-compliance with seaman’s ordinary duties and procedures; 
Inadequate on-deck and cargo work; 
Improper loading of passengers, cargo, etc.; 
Inadequate command and supervision over the services of seamen; 
Inadequate reporting and transfer of business; 
Improper handling of fire 
Force majeure Force majeure, etc.  
Source:JAMIA.(1998). 
 
However, as reviewed, there are still some common drawbacks lying in those widely 
used casualty and accident databases and reports in terms of human elements 
classification. In Marton’s and Purtell’s (1990) words to make a comment on this 
issue:   
(1). No comprehensive, standardized, validated and commonly accepted 
classification of human factors to adequately identify human factors 
involved in collision process; 
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(2) No standardized, hierarchically organized, concept or format for 
identifying human factor casualty data to identify and correlate direct error 
causes to the underlying and contributing factors that shape the behaviours 
responsible for error and collision events.  
   
3.2  Some theoretical researches results on human element 
classification 
 
For developing a suitable classification framework that maybe used in identifying the 
human elements in marine collision, it is necessary to view the researcher’s works on 
human failures and errors. This may give some help and inspiration. 
 
3.2.1. Reason’s classification 
 
Reason (1990,1993) classifies human failures into types and tokens. As shown in 
Figure 3.1, failure types are further subdivided into source failure types and unsafe 
act tokens. Failure types are found at the management level and failure tokens are 
founded at the front line crew level. 
 
Figure 3.1 The basic elements of safety information system 
Source: Reason, 1993 
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Unsafe acts are violations and results of motivation, individual and management 
attitudes and cultures, which are founded at higher levels in the organization (Reason, 
1990). Unsafe act tokens are categorized as slips, lapses, mistakes and violations 
(Reason, 1996, p.18). 
 
The next level in Reason’s safety information system scheme is the condition tokens. 
Condition tokens are psychological and situational precursors to accident scenarios. 
They are elements which contribute to unsafe acts such as working environments, 
training, design, hardware, maintenance, communication and the like (Reason, 1996, 
p.18). The root causes of each of these condition tokens are found in critical 
underlying contributing errors. 
 
Functional failure types are made at the line management level. It can be categorized 
into: inadequacies in operating procedures and conditions; system defects and 
inadequate defences; communication failures; design failures; and poor maintenances.  
 
Source failure types are decisions made at the strategic level of the organization; this 
can be directed at top-level management commitments to safety competence in 
addressing problems or lack of cognisance of the nature of the problem. 
 
3.2.2. Moore and Bea’s classification 
 
Moore and Bea (1993, p.3-10) categorized human element related casualty causes 
into 13 categories: commitment to safety; resources; human-system interface; 
knowledge /experience /training; maintenance; physical/mental lapses; violation; 
morale/incentives; job design; regulating/policing; operation policy; 
communication/information; and manning. The meaning and scope of these 
categories are given and defined as the following: 
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Commitment to safety is determined by the level of commitment of available 
resources and cognisance of potential problems to the safety of the operational 
system from top-level managers to front-line operating crews.  
 
Resources pertain to money and expertise used to heighten operational safety.  
 
Human-system interface encompasses failures and shortcomings of human actions 
resulting from inaccurate or insufficient information or from an inaccurate or 
insufficient response of control systems and control system display.  
 
Knowledge/experience/training pertains to human or organizational failures and 
shortfalls resulting from insufficient or improper knowledge, experience, or training 
of the system under normal or extreme operating conditions.  
 
Maintenance refers to the impact on ship operations as a result of improper, 
insufficient or a failure to conduct adequate maintenance, which is important to the 
normal and emergency operating systems.  
 
Physical/mental lapses, slips and mistakes pertain to physical or mental lapses, 
attention failures, memory failures and rule based mistakes, which cause or 
contribute to fail or inadequately manned functions or performances under normal or 
extreme operating conditions.  
 
Violations refer to intended unsafe acts as routine and exceptional violations or acts 
of sabotage.  
 
Morale refers to individual behavioral attributes while incentives pertain to the 
differences in goal and preferences at different levels in the organization that lead to 
inadequately manned functions or performances.  
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Job design encompasses the inappropriate match of personnel characteristics with job 
or inadequate job descriptions.  
 
Regulating/policing refers to the insufficient, inaccurate regulatory and policy 
making system or failure of organizations and regulatory bodies in continually 
maintaining or monitoring the integrity and reliability of the operating system.  
 
Operating policy pertains to organizational policies and procedures from top level to 
front-line management, which are conducive to the implementation of safety of the 
operating system.  
 
Communication/information refers to the incorrect, incomplete, or failure of the 
transfer of information between individuals, organizations, regulators, and systems.  
 
Manning embodies the inadequate manning in terms of number or expertise of 
individuals (Moore &Bea, 1993, p.3-10). 
 
Moore and Bea (1993) establish three stages of accident events: underlying or 
contributing events, direct events, and compounding events. Consequently, the 
causes contributing to the accident scenarios are also classified as underlying 
/contributing causes, direct causes, and compounding causes (as shown in Figure 3.2). 
Underlying/contributing causes represent latent errors in technology, organizational 
management, regulation, or immediate underlying causes for the specific error events. 
Direct causes are accident initiating errors or active errors by front-line crews, which 
directly affect the primary accident event. Compounding causes are latent errors in 
organization regulations, technological systems that enhance the casualty factors. For 
example, Figure 3.2 demonstrates the basic events of a potential vessel collision. 
Each of the events is influenced by particular human elements. (1) Vessel proceeds at 
an extreme high speed (contributing event), (2) the ship collides with other ship 
(direct event), (3) ship is damaged (compounding event). 
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Figure 3.2 Accident event dependencies on HOE factors for ship collision 
 
To examine the effects of external operating environments on error events and causes 
at the various stages in an accident sequences, Moore and Bea (1993, p.3-14) make a 
distinction between operating conditions (man-made or environmental) and error 
causes. The operating conditions are further differentiated into external and 
operational factors. Operational factors are specific to the operating environment. 
The external operating environment may contribute to events, decisions, actions or 
human errors. Vibration, noise, air quality, vessel traffic and smoke are classified 
into operational factors. External factors pertain to the external environment such as 
temperature, fog, rain, snow, wind, waves, time of day, ice and so on.  
 
3.2.3. SHEL Model 
 
The SHEL model was developed by Edward and modified by Hawkins (1987). It 
consists of four components: Software, Hardware, Environment and Live-ware. 
Furthermore, each two of these four components forms four interfaces between them: 
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live-ware/live-ware, live-ware/hardware, live-ware/software and live-
ware/environment as shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 SHEL Model 
Source: Hawkins, 1987 
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lifestyle, fatigue, duty, consumption of alcohol/drug and incapacitation are listed in 
this column. Psychological factors are those factors concerned with the individual’s 
Mind and thoughts. They include perceptions, attention information processing 
capacity and attitude towards specific tasks. Other aspects affecting the psyche of a 
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
                                                                
 
 
                                   
   L     L 
    L 
H 
S 
S 
E S 
H
H 
E 
 33
person such as personality, knowledge, training, planning of operation, confidence, 
and emotional status are also included in this category. Psychosocial factors result 
from the individual’s social situation. Personal problems such as mental pressure, 
interpersonal conflict, personal loss, financial problems, significant lifestyle changes, 
cultural differences and family pressure are usually taken as psychosocial factors; 
they may restrict capacities of a person in a crisis situation. (Schroeder, 2001). 
 
Around the central live-ware, there are hardware, software, and environment. 
Hardware refers to the equipment part used in a transportation system. It includes 
displays, controls, and ergonomic aspects of workstations. Software is the non-
physical part of the system including organizational policies, procedures manuals, 
checklist layout, charts, and advisories and computers programs. Environment 
includes the internal and external climate, temperature, visibility, vibration, noise and 
other similar factors, which constitute the conditions within which people are 
working. Sometimes the broad political and economic constraints under which the 
particular ship operates are included in this element. The regulatory climate is a part 
of the environment in as much as its climate affects communications, decision-
making, control and coordination. The persons around the individual under 
consideration are dealt with as peripheral live-ware. It talks about human-human 
interactions. This may include factors such as management, supervision, crew 
interaction and communication, and labour relations (Schroeder, 2001).  
 
Indeed, four interfaces mainly deal with the external and internal influences 
including ship, workplace, technology, human beings, weather, and fairway on the 
individual under consideration. Live-ware/live-ware or person-person refers to 
human interactions and communication covering the following aspects: oral 
communication (for instance, noise interference, misinterpretation, rate of speech, 
language barrier, and read back and hear back); visual signal (for example: hand 
signal, body language); crew interactions (for instance: supervisor, briefings, 
coordination, compatibility/team, resource management, task management, 
personality, and experience), controllers (for instance: supervision, briefings, and 
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coordination), passengers(for example: behaviour, briefing, knowledge of ships, and 
procedure), labour relation (for example: employee/employer management, and 
industrial action), worker-management relations (for  example: hierarchy, and Bridge 
Team Management),  pressures (for instance: mental pressure, morale, and peer 
pressure), and regulatory  agency ( for instance: regulation, standard, implementation, 
inspection, monitoring, audit, and support ). 
 
Live-ware/hardware refers to human-machine interaction. Design limitation in 
workstation configuration, instrument and workspace can affect the performance of 
the system and the individual; factors relating to the person to machine interface are 
included in this category. 
 
Live-ware/software refers to the factors relating to the person to system interface. It 
mainly focuses on the information transfer between the human and supporting 
systems. These factors usually include written information (for instance: manuals, 
checklist, publication, regulations, charts and publications, instruction, and 
standards), computers software and automation extent of the system. Regulatory 
requirements such as qualification, certification, medical certificate, license are also 
belong to this column. 
 
Live-ware/environment means the factors relating to the person to environment 
interface. It is usually divided into three parts: internal, external and infrastructure or 
supporting services. Internal part includes hear, cold, humidity, ambient pressure, 
illumination, glare, motion of vessel, noise interference, vibrations, air quality, 
pollution etc. External part refers to weather. Wind, fog, sea state, temperature, 
visibility and so on are belongs to this category. Infrastructure refers to port facilities, 
support equipment, company facilities and equipment and so on. Some other factors 
such as time of day, other traffic, and lighting glare are also classified into this 
category.  
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The first focus of the SHEL model is on the individual and his abilities and condition. 
His interactions other than at work are also here.  The second focus is on the different 
interfaces that can have an effect on overall performance of the individual. 
 
3.3. The human element classification recommended by IMO 
 
For the systematic investigation of human factors in marine casualty thus to 
determine accident causes, identify contributing factors and draw lessons, the 21st 
IMO general assembly adopted resolution A.884 (21)(IMO, 2000a) which amends 
resolution A.849 (20)(IMO, 1997 November 27) by adding the Guidelines for the 
Investigation of Human Factors in Marine Casualties and Incidents and designated it 
as Appendix 2 of the Code. Both the SHEL model and Reason’s Hybrid model are 
recommended by these guidelines as tools for collecting and storing human elements 
in marine accidents. 
 
Apparently, the SHEL model has provided a highly organized place to store 
information regarding unsafe situations (Landsburg et al, 1999, p.21) and human 
elements. The model can be used as a basis for determining the causes and 
probabilities, for it has taken into consideration of all the important work system 
elements and the interrelationships between the work system elements and has 
focused on the factors which influence the human performance by relating all 
peripheral elements to central human elements.  
 
The Reason’s model is established on base of the discovery that accidents usually are 
not caused by mistakes done by the front-line operators alone, and has considered the 
circumstances that persons not directly involved in a accident may contribute to the 
accident through creating a certain environment for the accident. It is deemed as an 
excellent tool for analysing the data from the SHEL model (Ferguson et al, 1999). 
The data collected in an investigation can be organized using multiple components of 
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the SHEL model, into a framework surrounding an occurrence template, based on the 
Reason (1990) model. Causal factors are thereby identified.  
 
The classification model, such as the SHEL and Hybrid model recommended by 
IMO provides a good backbone standard taxonomy, but when it is applied to the 
actual accident investigation and causation analysis, there are still some further work 
needed to be done. Some terms used in the model are not included in the vocabulary 
of the average mariners on a daily basis, which brings about the difficulties for 
common mariners’ use. 
 
3.4. Classification of human elements in marine collisions 
 
The classification used in this dissertation is established on the basis of the SHEL 
and Hybrid model. References to some research reports (Moore and Bea, 1993; 
Rothlum, 1996; Reason, 1996) and accident reports (MAIB, 1999,2000; TAIC, 2000; 
MIIU, 1996; MAIA, 1999) have also been made. The scope of human elements to be 
involved in the classification has been defined in chapter 2.   
 
3.4.1. Consideration in establishing the human element classification  
 
First of all, the goal of the classification should be considered. The main objective 
here is to systematically identify collision related human elements and analyse the 
accident causation. The classification must be complete enough for collecting and 
storing the relevant element data.  
Second, the preferences of users should be considered. Hopefully the dissertation 
may have reference values to collision avoidance researchers, marine accident 
investigators, shipping managers and operators, regulators and mariners, thus their 
preferred elements should be included. 
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Third, the complexity of the classification should be weighted against the preferences 
of the user. Standard vocabulary of interpretation should be used thus it could be 
easily understood and grasped by professional mariners and investigators who used 
to be mariners. 
 
Fourth, the compatibility of the classification should be considered. The 
classification should be such a taxonomy that could be adopted and at the same time 
permit sharing and storing of data not only for collision accident but also for other 
maritime accidents. 
 
Finally, for further development, the classification model recommended by IMO 
should be put in a priority position. 
 
3.4.2.  Structure of the classification 
 
The classification consists of three areas: unsafe acts and failure, underlying human 
elements, and influence factors and conditions. Figure 3.4 demonstrates the structure 
of the classification. Table 3.5 gives the human elements involved in the 
classification in detail.  
 
Unsafe acts and failure refers to errors committed by front-line watch keepers, crews, 
pilots and the like that directly lead to the occurrence of collision. Based on analysis 
results of collision accident reports (see appendix A), the following failures and 
unsafe acts that frequently occurred and lead to collisions are included into the 
following classification: 
• Poor lookout: includes no lookout and improper lookout because of dozing 
off, lack of experience or change of watch. 
• Poor passage plan: this item may refer to improper preparation for departure, 
lack of knowledge of the fairway and passage. 
• Failure to take early action: the action taken for collision avoidance is too 
late and leads to collision.  
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• Failure to obtain ships position and course: deviate from its own road 
without awareness. 
• Failed to comply with regulations: violate the requirements of COLREG, 
non-compliance with the rule for the prevention of collision at sea;  
• Error of judgement: failure in judging the meeting situation and 
circumstances and take an improper action based on this error judgement.  
• Unsafe speed: select an extreme speed that is too fast or too low under the 
current circumstances. 
• Improper ship handling: handle the vessel in improperly because of lack of 
skill of ship handling and knowledge of ship manoeuvrability and thus lead to 
collision. 
• Failure to compliance with seaman’s ordinary practice: no attention has been 
paid to good seamanship. 
• Misinterpreted communication: misunderstanding between crew and pilot, 
ship and shore, ship and ship, crew and crew. 
• Failure in using radar and ARPA: defective inspection, maintenance, 
handling and interpreting electronic navigation and collision aids, especially 
misinterpreting the information given by radar and ARPA. 
• Failure to post lights or shapes: failure to blow sound signals. 
• Violation: acts of sabotage. 
 
In most instances, collisions are caused by more than one unsafe acts and failures 
(Rothblum, 1996). In addition, there are also more than one human elements 
behind these unsafe acts and failures. The human elements listed in the following 
classification are particularly focused on: 
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Figure 3.4 Structure of human element classification for collision analysis 
 
• Physical factors: sensory limitation, including visual, hearing, touching and 
smelling limitation. 
• Physiological factors: fatigue, including sleep and duty; health including life 
style; drug and alcohol; 
• Psychological factors: attitudes, attention, judgement, workload, 
experience/knowledge/training, mental/emotional state, personality (such as 
withdraw, aggressive, show off), confidence (such as over confidence); 
• Psychosocial factors: pressure from social and family, crew interaction. 
 
External factors which may have a positive or negative influences on crews’ 
performance daily are listed in the right column of Table 3.5, They are categorized 
into three areas: organizational factors, operating environment, and external 
environment. 
 
  
   Collision
    Human 
element
Ship and 
technology  
Influences 
Organizational 
influences External  
environment 
influences 
Unsafe acts and 
failures 
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Organizational errors are created by top-level decision makers. They may take the 
form of under-manning, unworkable procedure, excessive time pressure, poor 
supervision and other workplace factors likely to promote human errors. 
 
Table 3.5 Human Elements Classification 
Unsafe acts and failure Human elements Influence factors 
Poor look out 
Poor passage plan  
Failure to take early 
action 
Failure to obtain position 
and course 
Failure to comply with 
Regulation 
Error of judgement 
Unsafe speed 
Misinterpreted 
communication 
Improper ship handling 
Failure to comply with 
Good seamanship 
Misuse radar, ARPA etc. 
Failure to display visual 
and sound signal  
 
Sensory limitation 
Health 
Fatigue 
Drug and alcohol 
Attention 
Information processing 
Workload 
Experience/knowledge/
training 
Mental emotional state 
Personality 
Communication 
Social pressure 
 
Organizational factors 
Manning 
Commercial 
pressure 
Supervision 
Safety culture 
Labour relation 
Operating 
environment 
Equipment layout 
information 
display 
maintenance 
automation 
Written 
information 
Noise and 
vibration 
Motion of vessel 
External environment 
Adverse weather 
Visibility 
Current and tide 
Fairway 
Other traffic 
Time of day 
Lighting glare  
 
 
Operating environment focus on noise and vibration on board of ship, motion of 
vessel such as pitching, rolling and heaving, equipment layout, information 
displaying, maintenance of the vessel, automation, for they have impacts on crew’s 
decision-making ability to certain extent. Some literature also takes it as technology 
factors (Rothblum, 1996) or ship environment (Huang, 1999, p6). 
 
External environment mainly consists of weather, traffic and fairway conditions. 
These factors such as adverse weather, restricted visibility, congested traffic, 
confined waters; time of day, and background of light may all have negative 
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influences on seafarers’ physical and mental performance, and therefore reduce their 
ability in judgement. 
 
3.5. Summary  
 
In this chapter, the most commonly occurred unsafe acts and failures in collision 
accidents were reviewed with reference to various casualty reports, safety digest, and 
accidents statistics and research literature. Based on the SHEL and Hybrid model 
recommended by IMO (2000), supplemented by the error classification given by 
Moore and Bea (1993) and incorporating the results given by current casualty reports 
and statistics, a human elements classification is developed which is particularly 
applicable for collecting the data of human element involved in collision at sea. The 
human element classification consists of three areas: unsafe acts and failures; 
underlying human elements; and external influence factors. Unsafe acts and failures 
include the front-line crew errors, which initiate the events of collision. Underlying 
human elements include individual’s physical, physiological, psychological and 
psychosocial states, which form the preconditions of crew’s unsafe acts and failures. 
External influences come from organization, ship and natural environment. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Identifying the Human Elements Involved in Collision   
  
 
The focus of this chapter is to identify the human elements involved in collisions at 
sea. Existing available written reports of collision accidents will be carefully 
analyzed. Seafarers and experts from various sections of the shipping industry will be 
interviewed by questionnaires. The results of these two approaches will be compared 
and discussed thereby to reach our goal. 
 
4.1. Identifying the human elements from the written accident 
reports 
 
4.1.1. Collision data search 
 
The written collision accident reports are selected as the main source for collecting 
the human element data involved in collision at sea. There are several kinds of 
formats for storing casualty data. Written reports and database are the primary form 
among them. However, computerized casualty database is usually limited in 
documenting accidents, which brings about the difficulty in finding the underlying 
causes leading to unsafe acts and failures. (Moore & Bea, 1993, p.2-1). Although the 
existing written accident reports also have this or that kinds of drawbacks, for 
example, there is no uniform description format and recording system and the 
accuracy of the reports are strongly influenced by the competence of investigators, 
they are still the most invaluable materials available for they provide an approach to 
look at the accidents themselves and the causes leading to the accidents. They allow 
researchers to examine the sequence of causal factors, which would be difficult to 
determine and identify by other means (Reason, 1990; Moore & Bea, 1993 p.2-1). 
They also provide researchers with a great deal of information to examine the effects 
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of contributing errors, factors and the limitations of human performance under 
various operation conditions.  
 
The written accident reports studied in this dissertation are mainly collected form the 
Internet and some printed publications. 13 out of the 100 collected accident reports 
come from the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) of the United 
Kingdom, 32 reports come from the Marine Incident Investigation Unit (MIIU) of 
Australia, 2 of them come from the National Transportation Safety Board of the USA; 
2 of them are written by Hong Kong Marine Department (HKMD); 21 of them come 
from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada; 1 comes from the Transportation 
Accident Investigation Commission (TAIC) of New Zealand; 1 comes from the 
Swedish Board of Accident Investigation(SBAI); the remaining  28 cases are taken 
from the Lloyds Law Report and the American Maritime Cases which have been 
quoted by Captain Cahill (1997). A comprehensive list of the collision casualty 
information is found in Appendix 2. Table 4.1 summarizes the sources of collision 
accident reports. 
Table 4.1. Source of the used written accident reports 
 
 The written reports are selected at 
random without any special 
attention to type of ships, time of 
day, and site of occurrence. All 
collected accidents occurred from 
the beginning of the 1980s to 
present. Most of them occurred in 
the 1990s. 
 
Source 
Number of used 
accident reports 
ATSB 32 
MAIB 13 
TSB 21 
TAIC 1 
HKMD 2 
NTSB 2 
SBAI 1 
Lloyds Law Report and American 
Maritime Case Quoted by Cahill 
28 
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4.1.2. Results derived from the written reports 
 
By analyzing the written accident reports carefully, the human elements involved in 
these accidents are roughly identified. These elements are classified into three 
subcategories: unsafe acts; underlying human elements; and external influencing 
factors, based on the classification system provided in Chapter 3. 
 
4.1.2.1 Unsafe acts 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the most frequently involved unsafe acts in collisions are 
poor lookout. 71% of the researched accidents are attributed to poor lookout. The 
second frequently involved unsafe acts are error of judgment. Failure in use of radar 
and ARPA ranks at position 3 of the frequency list. Half of the analyzed collision 
accidents have more or less relations with misuse of radar and ARPA. Failure to 
comply with the requirements of regulations, failure in communication and failure to 
display and sound signals rank at position 4 of frequently involved unsafe acts 
together. 41 of the 100 collision accidents are more or less caused by these unsafe 
acts. The rest frequently involved unsafe acts are ranked in the following orders: 
improper ship handling (35%), failure to take early actions (30%), unsafe speed 
(30%), failure to comply with good seamanship (24%), failure to take position and 
course (20%), poor passage plan (8%) and violation (8%). 
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Figure 4.1 Unsafe acts found in written reports 
 
Poor lookout refers to no lookout and improper lookout. These unsafe acts occurred 
in these collision accidents are considered as poor lookout: no lookout man is 
arranged at proper position, especially in restricted visibility conditions; the number 
of lookout men is not enough in prevailing circumstances; the duty of lookout is not 
properly conducted; all available means appropriate including the effect use of 
available instruments and equipment are not properly used; the situation is not fully 
appraised; anchor watch is not properly kept (Cockcroft & Lameijer, 1996, p.37; 
Cahill, 1997, p.210). 
 
Error of judgment refers to failure to judge the meeting situations and circumstances. 
The following acts have been classified as error of judgment:  assumption on scanty 
information; lack of judgment to differentiate between situations when it is safe to 
follow the routine and when circumstances require its suspension; judgment was 
made based on the old experience; failure to ascertain the situation in respect to 
whether or not the safe situation exists (Cockcroft & lameijer, 1996, p.37; Cahill, 
1997, p.210). 
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Failure in using radar and ARPA includes defective inspection, maintenance, 
handling and interpreting electronic navigation and collision aids. The acts that have 
been considered as failures in the use of radar and ARPA include the flowing: no 
operational radar on board ship; radar and ARPA are not at their optimum settings; 
the range scale is not properly set; the display is not properly chosen; the bearing and 
distances of approaching vessels are not taken at regular intervals and carefully 
evaluated by plotting or by some equivalent method; no continuous observation on 
radar and ARPA; too great reliance on radar and ARPA without a full, appreciation 
of its possible inaccuracies ( Cockcroft & Lameijjer, 1996, p.40; Cahill, 1997, p.54). 
 
Failure to comply with regulations covers much broader scope in general. All acts 
that deviate from the requirements of regulations may be considered as failure to 
comply with regulations. In this dissertation, it is limited to the unsafe acts that were 
not explicitly listed in the classification. For example, these acts will be deemed as 
failure to comply with the regulation: failure to give sufficient sea room to stand on 
vessel; action is not sufficiently bold to be ready apparent to other; failure to use 
available means to determine risk of collision; relied exclusively on the passing 
arrangement made on VHF R/T contrary to procedures as defined in COLREGS; 
make a succession of small alteration of course and /or speed in collision avoidance. 
Ignoring the requirements of local regulations has also been considered as failure to 
comply with regulations (Cockcroft & Lameijer, 1996, p.6; Wu, 2000, p.36). 
 
Failure in communication not only refers to misunderstanding between crew and 
pilot, ship and shore, ship and ship, but also includes no communication and failure 
in making use of all available means for communication. Those acts involved in 
collect cases have been deemed as failure in communication: misinterpreting the 
meaning of other ships, pilots, and masters; failure to exchange information between 
pilot and master; failure to report to master and pilot the information concerning the 
situation; failure to establish a communication by VHF between VTS and ship, ship 
and ship; failure to communicate in time.   
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Failure to display and sound signals is also a very common unsafe act in the studied 
cases. The acts that failed to post and display required lights and shapes under way 
and at anchor, and failed to exchange sound and light signals with other ships during 
collision avoidance action have been deemed as failure to display and sound signals. 
For instance, a vessel restricted in her ability to maneuver failed to show the relevant 
lights and shapes, a stand on vessel failed to sound short blasts to warn the give-way 
vessel that failed to take early action, and an overtaking vessel failed to sound signals 
to inform the overtaken vessel from the side she intended to overtake.  
 
Improper ship handling refers to ship maneuver that did not adapt to the prevailing 
situation and even worsened situation. The following acts occurred in the studied 
collision cases have been categorized as improper shiphandling: miscarrying out the 
shiphandling order given by pilot and/or by master; handling the vessel without 
considering the effects of winds, current, bank, shallow water and other external 
disturbances. 
 
Failure to take early action is also a   violation of International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea, (COLREGS) (Cockcroft & Lameijer, 1996, p.48). The 
give-way vessel failed to take early action and the stand-on vessel failed to take 
action at the moment when it is permitted by COLREGS are deemed as failure to 
take early action. 
 
Unsafe speed refers to the speed that makes vessel unable to take proper and 
effective action (Cockcroft & Lameijer, 1996, p.26). It may be too high or, in some 
special circumstances, too low. The following acts have been deemed as using unsafe 
speed: a vessel in fog without operational radar proceeded full ahead; a vessel 
reduced speed to such an extent that the steering became ineffective. (Cockcroft & 
Lameijer, 1996, p.26). 
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Failure to comply with good seamanship (Cockcroft & Lameijer, 1996, p.6) refers to 
the act that deviate from the customary ways which have been practiced by 
experienced seafarers for a long time and have been proved to be proper to 
navigation safety. The following acts occurred in the collision cases are deemed as 
failure to comply with good seamanship: failure to prepare anchor for emergency use 
when sailing in narrow channel; over relying on other vessels keeping out of their 
way when a vessel is underway but stopped; failure to take shallow water effects into 
account when sailing in confined waters; overtaken vessel failed to clear the path of 
the overtaking vessel.  
 
The following acts have been considered as failure to obtain position and course: 
failure to fix her position regularly in anchorage thus leading to collision because of 
dragging anchor; failure to fix her position and unawareness of the facts that the 
vessel was on the wrong side of the channel. 
 
This phenomenon in the collision reports has been deemed as poor passage plan:  the 
master know nothing or little about the local condition such as the tide, current, and 
the characteristics of the fairway when the ship is proceeding in confined waters or 
pilotage waters; there is no emergency plan on board ship for collision.  
 
Violation refers to the acts of sabotage. For instance, the act that a duty officer leaves 
the bridge for meals without any substitutes for help has been deemed as violation.   
 
Two points need to be mentioned here. First, all collisions studied were always 
caused by a combination of several factors. For instance, several unsafe acts may be 
found such as poor look out, error of judgment, improper shiphandling, and failure to 
comply with regulations involved in one collision case simultaneously. Second, one 
unsafe act sometimes may be classified into several categories at the same time. For 
example, the act to make decision on the scanty radar information may be deemed 
as poor look out, improper use of radar and error of judgment. Indeed, there is no 
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crisp boarder between each category in some cases; the classification is really a fussy 
set. 
 
4.1.2.2  Underlying human elements 
Behind each unsafe act there must be some kinds of underlying human elements that 
initiate it. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to gather the cues to those underlying 
human elements from the collected written reports. Some of the reports disclose 
more about underlying cause while others only give the information limited to direct 
cause. This situation impedes this study in depth on underlying human elements. 
 
 Figure 4.2 demonstrates the frequency of the underlying human elements involved 
in the collected collision cases. The obtained data seems meager, but some valuable 
cues about the underlying human elements can still be obtained from it. 
 
The most frequently mentioned underlying human elements in accident reports are 
experience, knowledge/training or competence. 54 out of the 100 written reports 
have indicated that unsafe acts were attributed by incompetence of navigators, that is 
to say, lack of experience; knowledge and training play an important role in 
collisions. Lack of local knowledge, lack of knowledge of regulations and 
shiphandling, lack of sea experience, lack of training in use of radar, ARPA and 
other electronic navigational aids are commonly found from the written accident 
reports. 
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Figure 4.2 Underlying human element involved in collisions 
 
Information processing capacity and communication rank at position two of the list 
of human elements involved. Information processing capacity is usually closely 
connected with the error of judgment. The higher the information processing 
capacity, the less the error of judgment. If a navigator failed to deal with the 
information exposed to him properly and thus lead to the error of judgment, it would 
by deemed as problems of information processing capacity. Communication refers to 
the communicating ability of navigators. The following factors leading to unsafe acts 
are deemed as communication elements: language barrier, misinterpretation, read 
back and hear back(Cole, 1999). 
 
Inattention is also a serious issue in collision accidents. The following phenomena 
are considered as attention problems: navigator focused his attention on maintaining 
his schedule rather than on a meeting with an approaching vessel; a prolonged period 
of overtaking involving no immediate risk of collision reduced navigators awareness 
of the potential eventual collision.  
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Fatigue has already been considered as a major human element involved in maritime 
casualties (IMO, 1993; USCG, 2001; Hanson, 1997; Scott, 1998), but the data that 
collected from the 100 collision cases cannot fully evidence it. Only 12 of them may 
be traced back to fatigue. According to those reports, fatigue is mainly caused by 
overload and lack of rest and sleep. Further more, overload and lack of rest are 
caused by prolonged poor visibility and lack of working hands. 
 
Personality of navigators is seldom mentioned in the written reports. The author has 
tried to find the cue from the description of the reports word by word. For instance, 
in one report, it is narrated that a third navigation officer who used to take small and 
late alterations in collision avoidance especially in front of new crews. According to 
this description, he deemed that the third mates personality belongs to the show off 
type.  
 
Some reports pay particular attention to drug and alcohol issues; however, only two 
collisions may be traced back to this factor. Health, mental emotional state, social 
pressure and sensory limitation are almost not mentioned at all in the collected 
reports. But, it does not mean that there are any such kinds of human elements 
involved in collision. The reasonable explanation for this result is that the 
investigator who wrote the report did not pay special attention to these aspects. 
 
4.1.2.3 External influencing factors 
While human elements directly affect navigators actions, the external factors have 
deep influence on human elements. The most frequently reported external factors in 
collected reports are fairway, visibility, team working, manning and supervision, as 
shown in Figure 4.3.  
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Figure 4.3 External factors involved in collision 
 
Manning and team working are the most frequently involved factors. The following 
acts and phenomena are considered as influenced by manning factors: no adequate 
hands maintaining look out tasks; duty officer with no appropriate certificate; master 
without local knowledge conning vessel in pilotage waters. Team does not refer to an 
act by one person but a continuous adaptation of all the team members to fulfill the 
team roles that they have been assigned (Swift, 1993, p.7). The following weakness 
found from the collected reports are deemed as a team working issues: ambiguity in 
ship position, navigation order, duty of team member; distraction from the duty of 
collision avoidance; internal and external communication break down; improper con 
and look out arrangement; non-compliance with plan. 
 
Supervision comes from the upper level. The following performances have been 
classified as lack of supervision: the absence of any guideline to owners and 
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operators by the flag Administrations. The absence of instruction to masters by the 
vessel operators: lack of instruction and navigation warning from VTS and port 
control. If ship owners failed to see that their instructions were in fact carried out, it 
has also been considered as a supervision problem. 
 
Safety culture may be defined as a clear understanding of the system and its features, 
positive attitudes towards safety measures, and incentive system that encourages 
safety in operations (Håvold, 2000, p.81). The problems in manning, teamwork, 
communication, and commercial pressure have more or less reflected the level of a 
companys safety culture. In this research the author only considers those collision 
accidents, which were caused by the navigators negative attitudes as cases, which 
have safety culture involved.  
 
Commercial pressure has never been mentioned in any of the collected reports, the 
author only makes the assumption on information whether the ship owner had asked 
for the expected time of arrival (ETA) from master and whether the owner had 
instruction about the ship speed in restricted visibility and narrow channels. 
 
Very little information about the operating environment could be picked up from the 
accident reports. No comments have been made on equipment layout except that of 
fishing and recreational boats. No information about noise and vibration on 
navigators performance except one case in which the pilots order was 
misinterpreted because of the sound interruption. Equipment failure caused by 
improper check and use has been considered as a maintenance issue. Automation 
influences occurred in the reports are mainly of the failure in transfer of steering gear 
from auto mode to manual mode. 
 
It is easier to pick up information about influence of the external environment on 
human elements from the written reports.  Nearly 60% of the collisions happened in 
confined waters, fairway, and harbor and nearby. 31% of the collisions occurred in 
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restricted visibility. The time of day also plays an important role in forming human 
beings performance. Figure 4.4 shows the relationship between watch-keeping time 
and the frequency of collision. Nearly half of the collision occurred in the period 
from 2000 to 0400 of the day.  Only 20% of collisions happened in the period during 
0800 to 1600 of the day. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
Frequency
0000-0400 0400-0800 0800-1200 1200-1600 1600-2000 2000-2400
time ofday
times of collision
Figure 4.4 Relationship between collision and time of day 
 
Other types of traffic, adverse weather, current and tide also have some influence on 
human performance to a certain extent.  In studied collision cases, adverse weather 
brings about difficulties to lookout, both visually and by radar; other types of traffic 
have an influence on the navigators decision ability. Unawareness of the existence 
of current and tide usually caused navigators to loss their awareness of the ships 
position in fairways.  
 
4.1.3. Main findings from written accident reports 
 
1 Poor lookout has been involved in most of collisions. It was embedded in the 
following aspects: lack of competent lookout men; improper lookout methods; 
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improper use or no use of all available means. Poor lookout usually was 
caused by: lack of experience, knowledge and training; poor communication; 
manning problem; poor equipment layout; problems in safety culture; over 
workload; poor teamwork organization; inattention. 
2 Improper use of radar and ARPA are still a common problems onboard ship. 
Examples found in the accident reports are listed as the following: 
misinterpreting the information showing on the radar screen; no patience to 
keep continuous radar observation; improper set the range scale of the radar; 
no radar plotting. The underlying human elements include lack of 
knowledge/experience/training, personality, and fatigue. The organizational 
factors and operational environment also have an influence to some extent. 
3 Error of judgment is another commonly involved human error in collisions. 
Error of judgment led to improper ship handling, and the further, improper 
shiphandling resulting in the collisions. The most frequently involved 
underlying human elements are skill/knowledge/training, inattention, 
information processing ability and communication. Fatigue and workload 
have also been mentioned as influencing factors on the navigators ability of 
judgment. Although mental state, social pressure and drug/alcohol have been 
mentioned or referred to as important accident contribution factors (Smeaton, 
Moreton & Dineley, 1996; TAIC, 2000), few cause records about this factor 
could be found from the reports. It does not mean that these factors might be 
deleted from the list of collision causes, but investigation methods need to be 
improved. 
4  Communication problems ranked high in the list of unsafe acts. The most 
frequently made mistakes are lack of communication and misinterpreting 
received information. The major underlying human elements found are the 
reluctance of navigators to exchange information. 
5 The main cause for failure in compliance with regulations may be explained 
as lack of knowledge and understanding of collision regulations and local 
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rules. Lack of supervision maybe deemed as the main cause. Other 
underlying human elements seem hard to come by. 
6 Failure to take early actions is the main cause of the close quarter situation. It 
frequently appeared in collision cases. Poor lookout may be explained as one 
initiating cause. There are still some other explanations; one may be that the 
navigator needs to get more information about the situation for the nearer the 
other vessels approaching; the more information becomes available to 
navigators. Another explanation maybe the torpor induced by the sheer 
monotony of watch keeping. The navigator thus may take a stress of close 
encounter as a relief. Personality, for instance, show off, may also be one of 
the explanation for later action. 
7 Apparently improper ship handling, failure to comply with good seamanship, 
failure to display signals has a close relationship with knowledge, skill, 
training and experiences. Personality may also play a certain role in this area. 
8 Fatigue is commonly deemed as one of the main causes of collision, but only 
a few direct pieces of evidence could be found from the collected cases. 
9 It is hard to come by the evidence of the organizational errors but many 
unsafe acts. For instance, lack of enough lookout men, chaotic teamwork on 
bridge, unsafe speed led to take the organizational factors as critical 
underlying causes. There are serious drawbacks in aspects of manning, 
supervision and a companys safety culture. 
10 Very few direct causes have been found about the influence of the operational 
environment on navigators performance. But it cannot be concluded that the 
working environment has no influence on human performance. More research 
work needs to be done on this issue.  
11 Most of the studied collision reports occurred in port approach, narrow 
channels, and rivers. The explanation may be: first, this is the water where 
traffic is densest; second there are some special adverse effects acting on 
ships in these waters, for instance bank effects, shallow water effects, 
interaction between ships, tide and currents; third, although there has been 
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VTS in some of those areas, it seems that their information have frequently 
failed to get communicated to the ship; lastly, navigation in narrow fairway is 
really an art, lack of ship handling skill, local knowledge, experience may 
result in accidents in these waters. 
12 Visibility is an important influencing factor in collisions. It is still common 
that navigators put over reliance on radar and ARPA in poor visibility. 
Failure to sound signal, failure to arrange appropriate lookout, failure to 
reduce speed, failure to communicate with other frequently appeared in this 
situation. The underlying cause maybe conducted with knowledge, training, 
experience, supervision and manning. 
13 Nearly half of the 100 studied collisions happened in the period of 2000 to 
0400 of the day, this may have little to do with darkness or light, but could be 
linked to body rhythms. 
14 Since 54% of the collisions were attributed to lack of knowledge, training and 
experience, how to explain the reason of those collisions caused by unsafe 
acts performed by well-trained navigators? Inattention, boredom, fatigue may 
be good reasons for the qualified navigators poor performance. 
15 It is true that the relationship between underlying human elements, human 
errors and causes of collision at sea is complex. However, it is necessary for 
collision avoidance to find the human elements that influence the human 
behavior leading to collision. Except the improvement of investigation 
methods, more and deep research work in this field needs to be carried out as 
soon as possible.   
 
4.2. Experts’ and seafarers’ view 
 
Experts and seafarers view on human element involvement may reflect the actual 
situation to a certain extent. As a means of compensation, their perspectives on 
human element involvement in collisions are investigated by questionnaires. 
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Since human beings view on something is always with more or less uncertainty or 
fuzziness, the questionnaires are also specially designed to reflect this 
characteristic. The interviewees are requested to confirm the given assumed human 
elements which may be involved in collision accidents or not with one of the four 
multiple-choices: very unlikely, unlikely, likely, and very likely. The main goal is to 
get the membership grade of listed human elements to a particular conceptual class, a 
fuzzy set labeled involved. If all respondents confirm an assumed element with 
very likely, then this elements membership grade to fuzzy sets involved will be 
1 if all respondents select very unlikely for an assumed element, then the 
membership grade of the element to fuzzy set involved will be 0.  The membership 
grade will always fall in the interval of real number from 0 to 1 or [0, 1]. Thus the 
result is a fuzzy set called involved. For determining which assumed human 
elements are involved in collisions, a cut value α is needed, if elements membership 
grade is larger than this limit α, for instance 0.65, then, an element is involved 
(Klir & Folger, 1988, p.10; Wang, 1995, p.54). 
 
Three hundred eighty seven out of 1000 circulated questionnaires have been 
recovered. This makes it possible to calculate the membership grade for each 
assumed human element. Respondents background has also been investigated by 
questionnaires, so it is also possible to analysis the influence of backgrounds on 
respondents view. 
 
4.2.1. Briefing the background of respondents 
 
One thousand copies of questionnaires were distributed to seafarers and experts in 
the maritime industry. Three hundred eighty seven of them have been recovered. The 
interviewees background is shown in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.5(a-g).  
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Chinese
77%
Developed nationality
6%
Other
17%
Chinese Developed nationality Other
Figure 4.5(a) Background of respondents (nationality) 
younger than 30
27%
30-40
43%
40-50
19%
older than 50
11%
younger than 30 30-40 40-50 older than 50
 
Figure 4.5(b) Background of respondents (age) 
 
 For convenience of analysis, respondents are divided into some sample groups based 
on nationality, education, occupation, sea experience, competence level and 
experience of collision/close-quarters situation (CQS) respectively. When nationality 
is considered, respondents are divided into three groups: developed nationalities, 
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Chinese, the other nationalities. When occupations are taken into account, 
respondents are divided into groups of seafarers, staff of shipping companies, 
administration of officers, and the other. The other group mainly consists of naval 
architects, staff of ports and nautical lecturers. Since collision accidents are mainly 
caused by navigational watch keepers, respondents are divided into groups of master, 
chief mate, navigational duty mate and the other when considering the competence 
level. Sea experience is divided into groups of no sea experience, less than 5 years, 
5-10 years and more than 10 years. Education background is divided according to the 
education level: post graduate, university, college, and the other. 
Seafareres 
55%
staff of shipping co.
3%
Ad. Officer
21%
Other
21%
0%
Seafareres staff of shipping co. Ad. Officer Other
 
Figure 4.5(c) Background of respondents (Occupation) 
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Post graduate
18%
University
29%
College
23%
other
30%
Post graduate University College other
 
Figure 4.5(d) Background of respondents (Education) 
 
No
9%
Less than 5years
33%
5-10 years
28%
more than 10 years
30%
0%
No Less than 5years 5-10 years more than 10 years
 
Figure 4.5(e) Background of respondents (sea experience) 
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Master
17%
Chief mate
10%
Navigation mate
24%
other
49%
Master Chief mate Navigation mate other
 
Figure 4.5(f) Background of respondents (competence level) 
 
Yes
36%
No
64%
Yes No
 
Figure 4.5(g) Background of respondents (experience of collision/CQS) 
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Table 4.2 Backgrounds of Respondents 
 
 
4.2.2. Fuzzy sets model and calculation of membership grade 
 
4.2.2.1 Constructing fuzzy sets 
Let X denotes the universal set, a set of assumed human elements. It will be: 
X= {x1, x2,x3,x4 ,xm}, m:  number of elements 
={Incompetence, error of judgment, improper look out, unsafe speed, failure to take 
early action, failure to comply with regulations, improper shiphandling, misuse radar 
and ARPA, negligence or misconduct, communication problem, mental state, anxiety 
and fear, health fitness, over work loading, fatigue, management, intentional 
violation, drugs and alcohol} 
m=18 
Let A denotes the fuzzy sets involved which is defined by membership function µA. 
µA has following form: 
                                                
1  Some respondents have selected two occupations in the questionnaire; for instance, he is both a 
seafarer and nautical lecturer. 
Background Number of respondents and their percentage (%) Total 
Chinese Developed Nationalities Other Nationality 
298(77) 23(6) 66(17) 
387(100) 
<30 30-40 40-50 >50 Age 
104(27) 166(43) 74(19) 43(11) 
387(100) 
Seafarers Ad. Officer Staff of shipping Co. Other Occupation 
218(56) 82(21) 12(13) 82(21) 
394(1) 
Post 
Graduate University College Other Education 
69(18) 112(29) 88(23) 118(30) 
387(100) 
No <5 5-10 >10 Sea experience 
(years) 33(8) 128(33) 108(28) 118(31) 
387(100) 
Master Chief mate Nav. mate Other Competence 
66(17) 39(10) 93(24) 189(49) 
387(100) 
Yes No Collision /CQS 
experience 138(36) 249(64) 
387(100) 
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         µA:    X → [0, 1] 
And A is expressed as    
A = (µA( x1), µA(x2),... µA(xm))                 m = 18 
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, there is no need for us to model a membership function but to 
calculate the membership grades of each element in the universal of discourse. 
 
4.2.2.2 Calculating the membership grade 
There are lots of means for measurement of membership grade. The commonly used 
way is to sample the statistical response pattern for the true or false question of the 
set membership. In the questionnaires, four choices are given; only one choice is 
required to be chosen. It is different from some traditional statistical methods, which 
only have yes, or no question. So the author has to reform the calculating method as 
follows: 
 
n
n
x j
n
iAj lim)(
∞→
=µ  
Where, 
Nnumber of respondents, it needs not be an infinite number (Wang, 1995, 
p.56), but big enough. 
njtimes of xi belongs to Aj 
j = 1, 2, 3, 4 
µA1very unlikely 
µA2unlikely 
µA3likely 
µA4very likely 
Let                   )()(
4
1
iAj
j
jiA xx µβµ 
=
=  
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Where 
              βj  are defined as weight factor on the base of degree of involvement of 
the human element, for meeting the requirement of normalization, the weight factor 
is defined as : 
  β1= 0.25, β2 = 0.5, β3 = 0.75, β4 = 1 
The membership grade calculated is shown in Figure.4.6.  When   µA (xi) are 
calculated, the fuzzy sets A will thereby be determined. 
 
4.2.2.3 De-fuzzying 
De- fuzzying the fuzzy set A may be done by a α-cut. α-cut of a fuzzy set A is a crisp 
set Aα that contains all the elements of the universal set X that have membership 
grade in A greater than or equal to the specified value of α. it can be expressed as 
                 Aα = {x ∈X | µA (x) α≥ } 
It is very critical to chose the value of α for it just determines which one will be 
deemed as the involved element. Since unlikely has already been given a weight 
value 0.5 and likely 0.75, it is better to select a value in this interval: 0.5-0.75.   
Here, α is given value 0.6. 
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 Figure 4.6 Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved in Collision Accidents 
 
4.2.3. Calculated statistical results 
 
Figure 4.6 demonstrates the membership grade of each assumed human element. 
Obviously the membership grade of violation is only 0.36. This means that it is 
unlikely that a human element is involved in collision. If α = 0.6, assumed elements 
such as health fitness, anxiety and fear will be eliminated from the set A 0.6. For α = 
0.7 more assumed elements, including incompetence, improper ship handling, misuse 
of radar and ARPA, mental state, drugs and alcohol will also disappear from set A 0.7. 
For α = 0.8, only a few assumed elements are left; they are error of judgment, 
improper lookout, failure to take early action. 
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Figure 4.7 to 4.12 show the comparison result of membership grade of assumed 
human elements on base of respondents background, including nationality, 
occupation, education, sea experience, competency level, experience of collision or 
close quarter situation. 
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Figure 4.7 Comparison of the View on HE Involved between Nationalities 
 
As demonstrated in Figure 4.7 the perspective of respondents of different 
nationalities seems similar in general. There is only some minor different opinion on 
error of judgment, mental state, drugs and alcohol.  Although all respondents 
consider error of judgment as a major factor leading to collisions, those from 
developed nations view it as a number one human element in collision. The 
respondents from China and developed countries deem mental states as a less 
involved human element, but respondents of other nationalities consider it as a likely 
involved human element. Drugs and alcohol is deemed as unlikely involved factor by 
the Chinese, west Europeans and Americans, while other respondents view it as a 
likely involved element.   
The comparison results based on occupation are shown in Figure 4.8.  It is interesting 
to see that while seafarers take incompetence as a less involved human factor, staff of 
shipping companies and others take the factor as a more likely involved one. The 
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perspectives on drugs, alcohol, overload and fatigue may well reflect the occupation 
background of the respondents. Staffs of shipping companies take drugs and alcohol 
as a serious issue while the others pay less attention to it. On the contrary to seafarers 
and the Administration officers who deem overloading and fatigue as likely involved 
human elements, staff of shipping companies do not take it as a serious issue. 
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Figure 4.8 Comparisons of the Views on HE Involvement between Different 
Occupations 
 
Figure 4.9 demonstrates the perspective of persons with different educational 
backgrounds. The difference of their views on incompetence and failure to comply 
with regulations has also reflected their educational levels. Obviously the persons 
with higher educational background put more emphasis on those human elements 
such as incompetence and failure to comply with regulations. 
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Figure 4.9 Comparisons of Views on HE Involvement between Different Education 
Level 
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Figure 4.10 Comparison of Views on HE Involvement between Different Sea 
Experiences 
 70  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Inc
om
pe
ten
ce
Er
ror
 of
 Ju
ge
me
nt
Im
pro
pe
r L
oo
ko
ut
Un
sa
fe 
Sp
ee
d
La
te 
Ac
tio
n
Fa
ilu
re 
to 
Co
mp
ly 
wit
h R
reg
ula
tio
n
Im
pro
pe
r s
hip
ha
nd
lin
g
Mi
su
se
 R
ad
ar 
an
d A
RP
A
Fa
iliu
re 
to 
Co
mp
ly 
wit
h G
oo
ds
ea
ma
ns
hip
Co
mm
un
ica
tio
n P
rob
lem
Me
nta
l S
tat
e
An
xie
ty 
an
d F
ea
r
He
alt
h U
nfi
tne
ss
Ov
erl
oa
din
g
Fa
tig
ue
Ma
na
ge
me
nt 
Pr
ob
lem
Vil
ati
on
Dr
ug
 an
d A
lco
ho
l
Human element 
M
em
be
rs
hi
p 
gr
ad
e
Master Chief Mate Nav.Mate Other
Figure 4.11 Comparison of Views on Human Element Involvement between 
Different Competence Levels 
 
Figure 4.10 shows the comparison results based on the sea experience. Apparently 
those who have longer sea experience put more emphasis on management, 
communication, good seamanship and mental states.  
 
Figure 4.11 demonstrates the perspectives of seafarers at various competent levels. 
Comparatively, the master emphasizes the competence more than others. Especially 
navigation mates and ratings, take fatigue as a more involved human element than 
that of the masters view. Chief officers, with more different opinion than others, pay 
more attention to judgment, lookout, good seamanship, and workload. 
 
The last comparison is made based on whether the respondents have experience in 
collision/close quarter situation. In general, there is no big difference between their 
views. Only minor differences could be found from their perspectives on these 
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factors such as competence, judgment, lookout, safe speed, early action, ship 
maneuvering, use of radar and ARPA, mental states, and management where the 
experienced respondents put a higher membership grade than those without 
experience. See Figure 4.12. 
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Figure 4.12 Comparison of Views on Human Element Involvement between the 
Collision/Close-Quarters Situation Experience 
 
4.3. Discussion 
  
Based on the data collected from the written reports and general perspectives of 
respondents, the author focuses his discussion mainly on the following questions: 
• How far are the human beings perspectives from the actual world? 
• What kinds of human elements are mostly involved in collision accidents? 
• What should and what could be done next in the research field of human 
elements? 
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4.3.1. How far are the human beings’ perspectives from the actual world? 
 
For the convenience of comparison, the statistical results got from the written 
accident reports and the calculated result based on the questionnaire are put together 
side by side in Table 4.3. It is easy to tell the similarities and differences between 
them. In general the respondents perspectives on human elements are roughly 
identical with the actuality. For instance, respondents view poor lookout and error of 
judgment as very likely involved human elements in collisions. Indeed the statistical 
data picked up from written report properly evidenced that. 
 
The inconsistency lies on the perspective towards the use of radar and ARPA, 
communication, early actions and fatigue. Compared with the actual data, the 
involvement of misuse of radar and ARPA, communication problems are 
underestimated while that of failure to take early actions and fatigue are 
overestimated.  
 
It does not mean that the data from the written reports are absolutely accurate while 
the membership grade of involvement calculated on the basis of respondents 
perspectives are inaccurate. Since human beings wrote the collision investigation 
reports, and data of human element involvement are extracted from these reports by 
human beings, there will absolutely be human error in the actual data itself.  
 
In general, the respondents view reflects the reality roughly; there is still a gap 
between them. To solve this issue, more research work on both aspects is needed.   
 
4.3.2. Which human elements are most likely involved in collision accidents? 
 
 According to the actual data collected from the written reports and the general 
opinion of 387 respondents, it may be concluded that improper lookout, error of 
judgment, failure to take early actions, failure to comply with regulations, improper 
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shiphandling, communication, poor management, incompetence, unsafe speed, and 
inattention are likely involved human elements or errors in collision accidents 
without hesitation.  
 
Table 4.3. Comparison between Human Beings View and Actuality on Human 
Elements in Collisions at Sea 
Human elements Involved times in the written reports 
Membership grade  
(respondents view) 
Unsafe acts 
Poor lookout 
Error of judgment 
Misuse of radar and ARPA 
Failure to comply with regulation 
Failure in communication 
Failure to display proper signal 
Improper shiphandling 
Failure to take early action 
Unsafe speed 
Failure to comply with good seamanship  
Failure to obtain position and course 
Poor passage plan 
Violation   
 
71 
64 
50 
41 
41 
41 
35 
30 
30 
24 
20 
8 
8 
 
0. 83 
0. 83 
0. 69 
0. 75 
0. 67 
/ 
0. 76 
0. 83 
0. 71 
0. 70 
/ 
/ 
0.36 
Underlying human element 
Experience, knowledge and training (incompetence) 
Communication 
Information processing 
Attention 
Fatigue 
Workload 
Personality 
Drug and alcohol  
Health 
Mental state 
Social pressure 
Sensory limitation  
 
54 
24 
24 
23 
12 
7 
6 
2 
1 
1 
1 
/ 
 
0. 69 
0. 67 
/ 
0. 70 
0. 78 
0. 66 
0. 63 
0. 61 
0. 54 
0. 67 
/ 
/ 
External factors 
Organizational  
Operational environment 
External environment 
 
See appendix c & 
Figure 4.3 
 
/ 
/ 
/ 
 
Because of the lack of data in the written accident reports, some other listed human 
elements especially these underlying human factors, for example, fatigue, workload, 
personality, and mental state seem not as significant as the above mentioned 
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elements. In conclusion, regarding these elements, more research and study are 
needed. 
 
4.3.3. What should and what could be done next? 
 
Obviously, there are at least two inherent defects in the collected data. First, the data 
collected from written reports are incomplete and maybe inaccurate. This problem 
has already been demonstrated in Table 4.3 where the occurrence rate of some 
human elements is extremely low, especially those under the heading of underlying 
human elements and external factors. It does not necessarily mean that these human 
elements are not involved in collision accidents, but the investigation did not get in 
touch with these elements. 
 
Second, the data obtained from the questionnaires are also scanty on underlying 
human elements and external factors. For the convenience of interviewing, a lot of 
human elements have been omitted from the questionnaires. The direct effect is that 
the author has no idea about the perspectives of the respondents on these elements. It 
hinders his further analysis of the involvement of human elements, especially 
underlying human elements involved. 
 
What could be done and what should be done? To improve the investigation, the 
collision accident investigation needs to be conducted deeper into the underlying 
human elements and external factors that may influence human beings behavior. 
Fortunately, IMO (1997, November 27; 2000a) has already recognized the issue and 
provided codes and guideline for investigating human elements involved in maritime 
casualties. What should be done is to implement the codes and guidelines actively. 
Assessment of its effectiveness is also necessary.  
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4.4. Summary 
 
Two approaches are used in identifying the human elements involved in collision. On 
the one hand, human elements involved in collisions are approached by a written 
accident report study. 100 collision cases have been carefully studied and analyzed. 
On the other hand, asking those who are involved in the maritime industry the 
answer to the human element involvement. A questionnaire for this purpose was 
specially designed and circulated to them. 387 respondents out of 1000 interviewees 
of the questionnaires contributed their perspectives on the issue. With these two 
approaches some commonly involved human elements are identified. 
 
The frequently occurred unsafe acts leading to collisions are poor lookout, error of 
judgment, failure to take early action, misuse radar and ARPA, failure in 
communication, failure to comply with regulations, unsafe speed, improper 
shiphandling, and failure to apply good seamanship. The underlying human elements 
of these unsafe acts are incompetence or experience/knowledge/training problems, 
communication barrier, inattention, fatigue and workload. The external factors which 
may influence the performance of navigators may include manning, supervision, 
team working, safety culture, confined fairway, time of day, restricted visibility and 
density of traffic. 
 
Most of the respondents view on human elements involved in collision properly 
reflected the actuality. What kind of inspiration will this result give to human beings 
and researchers? Research work needs to be done on this issue. In addition, the 
following areas also need to be explored: to identify the underlying human elements 
behind the unsafe acts of navigators in collisions; to clarify the external factors which 
may have influences on navigators performance; to conduct research into the 
interaction between various identified human elements for very few collision are 
caused by a single factor  
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CHAPTER 5  
Reducing the Involvement of Human Elements in Collision 
Accidents 
 
 
 Some human elements involved in collisions have been roughly identified in Chapter 4. 
This chapter focuses on identifying proper countermeasures against the negative 
influences of the human elements in collisions at sea. Therefore, the following work has 
been conducted: 
 
•  Searching from the present literature for countermeasures against human 
elements involved in collisions.  
•  Reviewing the methods and measures for human element reduction proposed 
by IMO. 
• Interviewing the opinion of seafarers and experts on this issue by 
questionnaires.  
Based on this work, countermeasures against human elements are discussed.  
 
5.1. Researchers’ perspectives on countermeasures against human 
errors 
 
The commonly proposed means and measures for reducing the human elements in 
maritime accidents by researchers are focused on education and training, safety culture, 
bridge resource management, and research on human elements.  
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5.1.1. Improving education and training methodology 
 
Since a great many maritime accidents including the collisions are attributed to lack of 
knowledge/skill/experience, failure in compliance with regulations, failure in 
compliance with good seamanship, misuse radar and ARPA, problematic 
communication, training and education will absolutely find its position in reducing the 
involvement of human elements and improving the standards of safety. The importance 
of education and training are commonly recognized. The key lies in improving the 
methodology of education and training. The following is a brief of researchers’ 
achievements (Kuo, 1998, p.170; Hanson, 1997; Peterson, 1996, p.257; Sanders & 
McCormick, 1987; Hoys & Zimdong,1988, p.188) : 
 
1. Although training and education are closely connected together, they are 
different in many aspects, therefore, their applications should be differentiated   
depending on the actual needs (Kuo, 1998, p.170). Training concentrated on human 
beings efficiency in doing a specific task, while education will also involve developing 
and changing the attitude, and behavior of those concerned. Training tends to achieve 
results more quickly, while education tends to take longer to achieve more fundamental 
outcome (Kuo, 1998, p.171). An example relating to teamwork on the bridge of a ship 
may properly explain these differences. Training will ensure that all the crewmembers 
work efficiently; however, education will try to generate a team spirit and a positive 
attitude towards the carry-out of duty on the bridge. It is easy for a trainee to achieve 
desired competence by training in short term, but to educate a navigator to keep safe 
speed in restricted visibility may take very much longer time (Kuo, 1998, p.171). In 
concern of the collision avoidance, training maybe used for enhancing the competence 
of navigators in use of radar and ARPA, while changing people’s attitudes towards 
collision at sea, education is needed.  
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2. The international regulations for preventing collisions at sea include (COLREG) 
two different kinds of rules in nature; therefore, for properly grasping the nature of the 
regulations, the use of education and training should be differentiated accordingly 
(Taylor, 1998, p.69). Some rules in collision regulations contain all of their meaning 
within the text, whereas rules depends on the meaning and on the knowledge of the 
system to which they refer and so can not be understood by reference to their task alone. 
Rules 20 to 38 in the collision regulations belong to the former kinds of rules, while 
rules 1 to 19 have the nature of the latter situation. For example, rule 23 prescribe in a 
very simple way lights and shapes to be shown by power driven vessels underway. 
These can be fully understood and complied with by anyone who knows the meaning of 
the words, whereas rules 16, “every vessel which is directed to keep out of the way of 
another vessel shall, so far as possible, take early and substantial actions to keep well 
clear”, is not easy to be understood by a person who has never been to sea. The phrases 
such as “so far as possible”, “take early and substantial actions”, “keep clear” are not 
precisely defined and have an unwritten meaning beyond the words themselves. Clearly 
both kinds of words can be learned in the classroom, and easily be remembered in 
parrot-fashion; however, parrot-fashion learning the rules such as rule 16 merely teaches 
a fairly obvious principle of collision avoidance. It is of little help in distinguishing 
proper from improper practices. For learning of such kind of rules more practical 
training on ships is needed. 
3. Simulators may be used as an effective means in developing and renewing the 
navigator’s skill in collision avoidance. It can be operated to train human beings in a 
stressful situation as well as in a complicated, sensitive or rare situation. Trainers may 
design collision situations they are going to use during the simulation training, if the 
causes and collisions of fault actions are known. 
4. The content of training courses should be designed according to the trainee’s actual 
requirements. For example, according to Wollski (1996, p.330) the underlying causes of 
improper use of radar and ARPA are the navigators’ lack of knowledge about the use of 
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radar and ARPA, about the limitation of radar and ARPA, and the navigators’ over 
confidence in the data obtained from the radar and ARPA screen. Therefore, it is very 
important that the contents of training courses should be designed to familiarize 
navigators with both capabilities and limitations of the radar and ARPA.  
5. Since problematic communication is mainly attributed to language barrier, the 
situation may be improved by properly designed language training. The Seafarers 
International Research Center at Cardiff cooperated with some partners such as World 
Maritime University (1999) conducting a study on maritime communication issue and 
recommended a set of guidelines for the way in which a maritime English syllabus 
should be created in their project final report. It points out that the ways in which 
English is used as maritime English is different depending on who uses it; therefore, the 
methods of delivery for language teaching should also be adjusted accordingly.  
 
5.1.2. Developing a safety culture 
 
Developing a safety culture within an organization is likely to be the most effective 
measures in accident prevention (Winbow, 1998, p.2). What is culture? The key feature 
of any culture is the existence of a belief or faith held by the individuals involved which 
is displayed in practice through their behaviors. (Kuo, 1998,p.167) Kuo defined the 
safety culture as “the philosophy of safety matters” held by organizations and 
individuals, which is demonstrated in practice through their attitude, actions, and 
behavior. Many collision accidents are due to unsafe acts or performance by navigators. 
These errors or more often violations of ordinary practice of seamen or established rules 
can really be avoided. Those who make them are often well aware of their errors. They 
may have taken short cuts they should not have taken. Almost all of the navigators have 
received education and training in collision avoidance, but collisions still occurs at a 
high rate. This issue may be attributed to the navigator’s attitude towards safety. Since 
individuals’ attitude toward safety is shaped to a large degree by the culture of the 
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company, developing a safety culture in a shipping company is an effective way to deal 
with this issue. The challenges for company mangers are not only how to instill the skills 
or knowledge, but also to change the attitudes necessary to ensure the safety objectives 
are met. (Huo, 1998, p.167; Winbow, 1998, p.2)  
 
Possible ways of implementing good safety practices include definition of the 
company’s corporate safety goals; standards and procedures should be laid down for 
every task, for instance watch keeping, which has critical safety implications and 
effective monitoring systems should be developed to check their constant 
implementation; all individuals should be encouraged to examine and constructively 
discuss safety issues; a safety information system that collects, analyses and 
disseminates information from accidents or near misses should be created; a company 
must possess a learning culture – the willingness and competence to draw the right 
conclusion from its safety system and implement major reforms when its need is 
indicated. (Reason, 1997, p.72) 
 
5.1.3. Using human error assessment and reduction techniques 
 
In general human reliability in collision avoidance is constrained by impaired system 
knowledge, response/processing time shortage, poor feedback information, difficulty in 
judgment, overall levels of alertness, operational environment, and personality. The 
application of methods to reduce the impacts of these general sources of failure potential 
has an active prospect of making the right improvement to man-machine reliability and 
minimizing the contribution of human error to collision.  
 
Based on the human error analysis and reduction techniques (HEART), Williams (1994, 
p.9) proposed the following general strategies for achieving effective human 
performance offshore, which is also applicable in collision avoidance:  
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1. Provision of adequate training and precise rules of engagement for personnel 
when confronted by a phenomenon outside their experience.  
2.  Keeping the information, precisely requirements, as low as possible, without 
making the rule uninteresting. 
3. Providing diverse means of checking information and reversing unintended 
actions. 
4. Providing immediate feedback that operation have succeeded or failed and what 
the performance standards are in the first place. 
5.  Providing an incentive to maintain performance and means of knowing that task 
synchronism is being achieved. 
6. Providing an appropriated environment, which will promote high satisfaction, 
health and performance. 
7. Appreciating that humans are not good at diagnosis of failure. 
 
 
5.1.4. Managing bridge team and resources 
 
An accident, such as collision, is unexpected, but most accidents occur because there is 
no system in operation to detect and consequently prevent one person making a 
mistake—a mistake of the type all human beings are liable to make. (Swift, 1993, p.11) 
Bridge team management is one solution to this issue. Bridge team management of a 
way of working which recognizes that reliable and consistent standards can only be 
maintained if navigation is based upon principles and reinforced by effective 
management. 
 
USCG has developed a team approach to reduce navigational and operational mishaps. 
(Hanson, 1997, p.4) The approach requires the team to be proficient in seven skills such 
as leadership, mission analysis, adaptability and flexibility, situation awareness, 
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decision-making, communication and assertiveness. If these requirements are met, the 
organization’s safety culture will ultimately be changed. 
 
The Swedish Club developed a bridge team management (BRM) training course to 
increase safety at sea. The aim of the programme is to minimize risk by creating positive 
attitudes towards communication, coordination, leadership and standards of operation 
procedures. The topics covered in the course are divided into 12 modules: cultural 
awareness, communication and briefing, challenge and response, authority and 
assessment, short term strategies, management styles, state of the bridge, attitudes and 
management skills, leadership in emergencies, human involvement in error judgment 
and decision making, and workload. (Herngvist, 1996, p.334) 
 
5.2. IMO’s work on reducing human element involvement in maritime 
accidents 
 
It was not until the end of the 1980s that the International Maritime Organization shifted 
its attention from the development of technical standards in ship design and construction 
to the human element of daily operation and ship management. The major work IMO did 
in reducing the human error in casualties include the 1995 amendments to the 
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers (STCW 78), the adoption of the International Safety Management Code (ISM), 
the application of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), and the adoption of the Guideline 
for the investigation of human factors in marine casualties and incidents. Special 
attention of IMO has been paid to fatigue problems. (IMO, 1996a; Eriksson & Mejia, 
2000, p.8; Winbow, 1998, p.2) 
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5.2.1. The STCW Convention 
 
The revised STCW Convention forms a sound foundation for safe ship operation; many 
of the accidents and incidents, for example collision and close-quarters situations that 
continue to occur could arguably have been prevented, had seafarers met the minimum 
standards of competence and owners and managers fulfilled their obligations in the 
STCW Convention and Code. (Winbow, 1998, p.2) Numerous new provisions that 
address operational or “human element” aspects have been dealt with by new provisions 
include communication, working language, medical fitness and prevention and 
mitigation of fatigue. 
 
Because a high proportion of maritime accidents was contributed by poor 
communication, STCW 95 requires that everyone involved in watch keeping should 
ensure that “ communication are clear and concise at all times and orders are 
acknowledged in a seamanlike manner”. Since multinational crews man more and more 
ships, language is becoming an increasingly serious factor in safe operations. 
 
While there is not one standard maritime language, English has been deemed as a lingua 
franca on board ships by the STCW amendments. Navigators, engineers and GMDSS 
radio operators are required to “be able to use English in written and oral form”(IMO, 
1996a). All ratings forming part of a navigational watch, on the other hand, are required 
to be able to “steer the ship and comply with helm orders also in the English language”. 
 
Since illness is a potential threat and danger to personnel on board ships and safety of 
ships while medical care is inaccessible at sea, medical fitness is a natural requirement 
for seafarers. Therefore, STCW 95 requires State party to the convention to establish 
standards of medical fitness for their seafarers, particularly in the areas of eyesight and 
hearing. 
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Fatigue was shown by numerous studies (IMO, 1997d) to be “ a contributory factors in 
33% of critical vessel casualties”. Because of its obvious risk to maritime safety, 
prevention and mitigation of fatigue have been the focus in STCW 95. It requires that 
watch systems must be so arranged that watches keeping personnel be not impaired by 
fatigue. For this purpose, the convention provides a rest hour limits for watchkeepers.  
 
Except the above-mentioned work, another contribution of STCW 95 to reduction of 
human error in accidents is its help in developing a safety culture. For example, 
familiarization training for those at sea or new to a specific company, required by STCW 
95, is a very effective way in instilling the safety culture in them. 
 
5.2.2. International Safety Management Code 
 
The adoption of the International Safety Management Code is another important step 
taken by IMO in reducing human elements involvement in maritime casualty. Since the 
human element is deeply influenced by organizational factors (Reason, 1997, p.71), the 
role of ship owners and managers in safe shipping operations should also be emphasized. 
The ISM Code introduces measures designed to improve the quality and accountability 
of those who are mostly involved with shipping operations (O’Neil, 1996; Eriksson & 
Mejia, 2000, p.18; Kuo, 1998, p.155). ISM Code emphasizes, “In matters of safety and 
pollution prevention it is the commitment, competence, attitudes and motivation of 
individuals at all levels that determines the end result”. 
 
The ISM Code’s objectives are “ to ensure safety at sea, prevention of human injury or 
loss life, and avoid damage to the environment”. To achieve those objectives, the ISM 
Code requires every company to develop, implement and maintain a safety management 
system. This system should include a company’s safety and environment protection 
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policy, instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships, procedures for 
reporting accidents and non-conformities, procedures to prepare for and respond to 
emergency situations, procedures for internal audits and management reviews and 
defined levels of authority and lines of communication between and amongst shore and 
shipboard personnel. (IMO, 1993b). 
 
5.2.3. Formal safety assessment 
 
Formal safety assessment has been introduced at IMO as “a structural and systematic 
methodology, aimed at enhancing maritime safety by using risk and cost/benefit 
assessments”(Rosmussen, 2000). It is a five-step processing consisting of: identification 
of hazards; risk assessment; risk control options; cost-benefit assessment; 
recommendation for decision-making. (IMO, 1995b; Rasmussen, 2000). 
 
FSM formalizes the application of risk-based thinking. A lot of analytical techniques 
have been arrived at in conducting it. For instance, fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, 
regulatory impact diagram, failure mode and analysis, hazard and operability studied, 
especially human reliability analysis and human element analyzing process are 
commonly used techniques.  
 
Trial application of the FSA methodology on RO-RO passenger ships, high-speed craft, 
oil tankers, and bulk carriers has already been conducted by some governments and 
organizations (IMO, 1996b, 1997b, 1998a, b, 1999, 2000c, d; Eriksson & Mejia, 2000, 
p.23). It is still evolving at IMO, with much research still being undertaken to determine 
how human factors would be incorporated in a practical and usable manner (Kuo, 1998, 
p.149). 
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5.2.4. Casualty investigation 
 
The investigation of maritime accidents and casualties play a very important feedback 
function in the promotion of safety (Eriksson & Mejia, 2000, p.30). Since careful 
analysis of casualties “can lead to greater awareness of casualty causation and result in 
remedial measures…for the purpose of enhancing safety…”(IMO, 1997 November 27), 
IMO adopted the code for the investigation of marine casualties and incidents in 1997. 
For further addressing the human elements in casualty investigation, IMO amended the 
code by adding the guidelines for the investigation of human factors in marine casualties 
and incidents into its Appendix. (IMO, 1997 November 27, 2000a). 
 
The guidelines offer methods and techniques for the collection and analysis of 
information, which help the investigator to methodically identify human factors leading 
to the accident. The objective of the guideline is to alert the maritime seafarers to the 
contributory role of human elements in causing accidents at sea. This awareness would 
in turn be beneficial to any programme to mitigate human error, and therefore this would 
lead to the improvement of safety at sea. 
 
5.3. Experts’ and seafarers’ perspective in measures for reducing 
involvement of human elements in collisions 
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, the author specially conducted an interview on a 
mount of seafarers and experts in the shipping industry for their views on the human 
elements involvement in collision accidents by questionnaires. 387 interviewees 
responded to the questionnaires. Some of them even made extra comments and 
recommendations on methods and techniques that may be helpful and applicable in 
human error reduction. 
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5.3.1. Statistical results of respondents’ perspectives 
 
Ten assumed measures are listed in the questionnaires. Interviewees were required to 
confirm the assumed measures with yes or no. Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 demonstrate the 
statistical results of the respondents’ opinion on countermeasures suitable and applicable 
for fighting against the impacts of human elements involved in collisions. 
 
82% of the respondents took enforcement of training and education as an effective 
countermeasure in reducing the involvement of human elements in collisions at sea. 69% 
of the respondents confirm the measure “to promote and support the research work on 
human element issues”. Improving the management both onboard ship and ashore has 
also been confirmed by a majority of the respondents. Other assumed measures which 
have got a majority support are: upgrading and updating the relevant knowledge in time; 
establishing a quality system; insuring the minimum safe manning; enhancing the 
international cooperation on training, research and technical issues; equipping the ship 
with more automated instruments and systems for reducing the work load of human 
beings.   
 
Other two assumed measures, amending, or establishing international conventions and 
national legislations and improving ship design, have failed to get majority confirmation. 
 
For convenience of further analysis, experts’ and seafarers’ opinions are divided into 
different groups according to their background. Figure 5.2-5.7 shows the different 
comparison results based on background of nationality, occupation, education, 
competent level, sea experience and collision/close-quarters situation experience 
respectively. 
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Table 5.1 Respondents’ View on Countermeasures against HE in Collision at Sea 
Countermeasures Number of  “yes” Percentage  (%) 
Enforcing training and education both on board ship and 
ashore 
318 82 
Upgrade and update the relevant knowledge in time 256 66 
Enhancing the international cooperation on training  and 
research 
208 54 
Amend, establish, and put in order the international 
convention and national legislation  
163 42 
Improve the management both ashore and on board ship 263 68 
Improve ship design 121 31 
Equip the ship with more automated 198 51 
Insure the minimum safe manning 243 63 
Establish quality system 229 59 
Promote and support the research work on human elements 268 69 
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Figure 5.1 Respondents' View on Assumed Measures 
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Figure 5.2 Comparison between the Views on Human Error Reduction Measure 
Based on Nationalities 
 
It seems that the difference in opinion on countermeasures for fighting against impacts 
of human elements involved in collisions is not very significant. Figure 5.2 demonstrates 
the opinions of the Chinese, developed nationalities and other nationalities. They share 
the same opinion of the importance of training /education and enforcement of human 
element research. The most obvious differences among their opinions are about 
management, quality system, safe manning and automated equipment. It seems that the 
respondents from developed nations emphasize more on management and quality 
systems than the other nationalities did; the Chinese gave a higher priority to automated 
equipment than others did ; the respondents from other nationalities pay more attention 
to safe manning than those from developed nations and China . 
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Figure 5.3 is about the opinions of respondents with different occupational backgrounds. 
The apparent differences among their opinions are mainly about safe manning 
automated equipment and legislation. Seafarers put the safe manning, automated 
equipment, and legislation in a more important position than that of the rest of the 
respondents did. Particularly, there is a strong contrast between the views of seafarers 
and staff of shipping companies on safe manning issues.    
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 Figure 5.3 Comparisons between the Views of the Respondents on Human Error 
Reduction Measures Based on Occupation 
 
Figure 5.4 demonstrates the perspectives of the respondents with different 
educational backgrounds. The main diversity lies on update knowledge in time, safe 
manning, automated equipment and research on the human element. It seems that 
people with lower educational background take safe manning more serious while 
those with higher education background put more emphasis on knowledge updating. 
It is interesting to see that the respondents with university and college background 
put more emphasis on research work than those with post graduate background.  
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Figure 5.4 Comparisons between Views of Respondents on Human Error Reduction 
Measures Based on Education Level 
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 Figure 5.5 Comparisons between the Views of the Respondents on Human Error 
Reduction Measures Based on Competence Level 
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Apparently, those with lower education background pay more attention to automated 
equipments. 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the comparison results on the basis of competent level. In general, 
the difference of their opinions mainly focused on management improvement, 
quality system establishment, automated equipment and research. On management 
and quality system issues, all other seafarers put more importance on it than the chief 
officer did. The chief mate also paid less attention to research work on the human 
element, but the chief mate and navigational mate emphasized the automated 
equipment more. 
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 Figure 5.6 Comparisons between the Views of the Respondents on Human Error 
Reduction Based on Sea Experience 
 
Figure 5.6 gives the comparison results based on sea experience. There is an obvious 
difference between the view of those with sea experience and those without sea 
experience. Those without sea experience pay more attention to updated knowledge 
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and management improvement while those with sea experience emphasize more on 
automated equipment and safe manning.  
 
Figure 5.7. Demonstrates the opinion comparison on the basis of collision experience. 
Those who have collision or/and close-quarters situation experience emphasize more 
training and knowledge updating than those without experience. 
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Figure 5.7 Comparisons between the Views on Assumed Measures Based on the 
Experience of Collision/Close-Quarters Situation 
 
5.3.2. Extra recommendations and comments given by respondents 
 
Besides confirming the assumed measures listed in the questionnaire, many respondents 
have also made some extra recommendations and comments on countermeasures against 
the involvement of human elements in collisions. The following is a summary of their 
extra comments and recommendations. 
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1. The length of working period on board ship should be limited. Overlong working 
period on board ship is also a dangerous factor influencing seafarer’s 
performance. It impairs the mariner’ ability to perform his tasks safely and 
effectively. Overlong working period on board ship means seafarers have to 
endure a long time of harsh working conditions and separation from loved ones. 
These unfavorable conditions will definitely have a negative influence on 
seafarers’ mental and physical state; thus, deteriorate their ability to perform 
their duties. There should be legislation at least at national level to stipulate the 
limitation of the period that a seafarer may work on board ship each time.    
2. Seafarers should be properly motivated. Motivation is a very important means, 
which may affect human beings’ attitudes and performance. The effective 
methods for motivating seafarers on board of ship may include: enhance their 
salary and allowance in time; provide them a comfortable living and working 
environment; show loving care for those who work on board ship from the 
company; reduce the pressure acting on seafarers from various sources such as 
company, family and crewmates. 
3. Education and training should not only focus on upgrading and updating skills 
and knowledge but also on developing a safety culture. All relevant individuals 
and organizations should pursue the cultivation of a safety culture continuously 
and vigorously. Seafarers’ professionalism including pride in profession, sense of 
value and ethics need to be developed. Education and training is an available and 
practical means for achieving these objectives. All relevant personnel should be 
made aware of the inherent dangers posed by different situations and the causal 
effects which can lead to casualties through improved education and training. If 
people in general have a sound safety consciousness and a positive attitude 
towards safety, the impact of the human element in all marine accidents and 
incidents including collisions would decrease. 
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4. The current regulation should be enforced and properly implemented. No more 
new regulations are required. The existing regulations are quite good and 
adequate. The problem is that people intentionally or unintentionally refuse to 
use them. People do not follow the requirements. To deal with this issue, 
education is needed. Some kinds of enforcement, for instance punishment on 
violation of regulations is also needed. 
5. Efficient and effective communication between ship and shore, seafarers and 
their families should be properly maintained. To those who have been separated 
from society and family for a long time, communication seems critically 
important in calming their anxiety and improving their performance. 
 
5.4 . Discussion  
 
1. Education and training 
All parties, whether researchers, IMO, or respondents of the questionnaires, consider 
education and training as a most effective means even as a sole effective means in 
certain circumstances (Kuo, 1998, p.170) in reducing the impacts of human elements in 
maritime accidents. But the following points should be made clear when conducting 
education and training. 
 
First of all, objectives of education and training are understood as “ to achieve or 
enhance the competence of individuals for doing a specific task” (Kuo, 1998, p.171). 
Indeed, it is also playing an important role in changing individual’s attitudes towards 
safety and profession. Second, trainees should not be limited to seafarers on board ship. 
All relevant personnel both on board and ashore must be educated and trained on safety 
issues especially human element involvement. Third, all available means should be used 
in education and training. It should not be limited in classroom ashore, but on-job 
training should also be conducted. It should not be limited to books and paper, 
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simulators, computers and other advanced techniques should also be taken advantage of. 
There is no conflict among them, no reason to replace this one with that one, but 
integrate them and enhance each other. Lastly, education and training is not a one-day-
task. Continuing education and training should be maintained. It is difficult to over stress 
the importance of upgrading and updating the knowledge, skill and safety consciousness 
in time.   
 
2. Research work on the human element 
Since the end of the 1980s, in the wake of casualties such as Herald of Free Enterprise, 
the human element has been a hot topic in the maritime industry. Many researchers, 
organizations, member States to IMO (Eriksson & Mejia, 2000, p.37; IMO, 1995a, 
1995b, 1995c, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d; 
MAIB, 1991; Williams, 1994) focus their energy on the study of the human element in 
maritime casualties with the aim to determining the most effective means of preventing 
or mitigating the impacts of human error and thereby to promote safety of life at sea and 
prevention of marine pollution. Although a great advance has already been made in the 
human element study field for instance, the successful trial application of formal safety 
assessment, there are still some issues that need to be solved before even greater 
progress and breakthrough could be made.  
 
First, cooperation among all maritime States should be strengthened; there should be a 
general research plan integrating all these States together as a research body. Since 
shipping is an international industry, multinational crewmembers are used worldwide; it 
is not enough that only a few developed maritime nations have an interest in the human 
element research. Only with the efforts of the entire international maritime society, can 
the goal of reducing human element impacts in marine accidents be achieved. Second, 
there need be a sound research work agenda. It seems that most of the searchers’ 
attention is focused on formal safety assessment and management of fatigue. How about 
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other issues? For instance, the relationship between each assumed psychological, 
physical, physiological factors in accidents, the interaction between the various 
identified hazards, they are an integrated part of the total research work and cannot be 
overlooked. Lastly, the research attention should also be devoted to devising some more 
appropriate methodologies or procedures that can assist all relevant personnel to reach 
the requirements of the modern shipping industry, to be qualified in competence and to 
have proper attitudes and professionalism.  
 
3. Management of bridge team and resources 
Enhancing the safety management and bridge resource management are frequently 
mentioned in various pieces of literature about the human element. IMO specially 
provides standards for the safe management and operation of ships by adoption of the 
International Safety Management (ISM) Code and requirements for establishing a 
quality system by STCW 95. In the questionnaires, most of the respondents have also 
confirmed the assumed measures of improving management both on board ship and 
ashore. Since it is such a widely accepted measure and it has been applied in the 
shipping industry for a long time, why do accidents including collision caused by poor 
bridge management still occur at such a high rate? Poor implementation may be one of 
the explanations to it. Therefore, the author would like to emphasize that implementation 
is as important as management it self. For real and effective implementation of the ISM 
Code, a quality system and other safety management systems, their need to be common 
standards applied throughout the entire maritime industry. 
 
4. Safe manning 
Inadequate manning has already been repeatedly evidenced to be one of catalysers to 
human elements and unsafe acts, for instance fatigue, inattention, poor lookout, poor 
management and error of judgment, leading to the accidents. This issue has already 
drawn attention from various parties. IMO (1993,1999) and ILO (1996) issued the 
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principle and requirements on safe manning that the manning level should be high 
enough to maintain a safe navigational watch. But manning problems still exist. 
According to the recovered questionnaires, the most repeated complaints are about 
workload and rest. Respondents who were seafarers complained that they always work 
overtime since there is not enough hands; they feel fatigue because of the workload and 
lack of rest. This is why a much higher proportion of seafarer respondents than that of 
other groups confirm safe manning as necessary countermeasure against impacts of 
human elements in collisions. To ensure the safe manning, strict implementation of 
relevant regulations and maintenance of higher manning levels are required.  
 
5. Regulations 
Regulations issued by international organizations or maritime States or local maritime 
authorities have really improved the safety situation at sea very much. This is why where 
a serious maritime casualty occurs, there is a new regulation or a new amendment of an 
existing regulation. But, many researchers (Kuo, 1998, p.167), and respondents of the 
questionnaire hold different opinions. They thought that the removal of human error 
couldn’t be achieved by more legislation. The most effective and practical way is 
implementing the existing regulations seriously, and improving the education and 
training to make all relevant personnel be more aware of the human element 
involvement in accidents.  
 
6. Ship design and automated equipment 
The assumed countermeasures, improving ship design and equipping the ship with 
automated equipment, specially designed to improve navigators’ operating environment 
and to reduce their workload only got a very few respondents’ confirmation. In the 
collected 100 collision accident reports, investigators also rarely mention this issue. 
Thus it cannot be concluded that properly designing the ship and equipping the ship with 
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more advanced equipment are less important, but more research on this issue should be 
done. Maybe cost and benefit assessments are needed. 
 
7. Difference among the opinions of respondents 
In general, there is no big difference among the perspectives of the respondents except 
some minor ones. The following are what the author thought valuable to mention here. 
 
First, respondents from developed nations pay more attention to management 
improvement than others; the Chinese seem to attach more importance to automated 
equipment. The author is not sure whether it is because of the difference of culture, but 
some Chinese respondents explained in the questionnaires that automated equipment is 
helpful in reducing the workload for watchkeepers. 
 
Second, seafarers give higher priority to safe manning. This just properly expresses the 
minds of front-line operators: it is they not others who suffer the impacts of lack of 
hands, overlong working hours, fatigue and overload. From the point of view of safety, 
managers of shipping companies and safety administrators should listen to seafarers’ 
voice and pay more attention to manning issues. 
 
Third, respondents with higher education backgrounds emphasize more knowledge 
updating than others while those with lower education background pay more attention to 
safe manning and automated equipment. Perhaps this is because most of those with 
lower education background are seafarers and front-line operators.   
 
Fourth, chief officers seem to be a special group for their opinion on some of the 
assumed countermeasures as it is much different from other groups. It seems that they 
pay more attention to automated equipment and manning than others. 
 
 99
Finally, those with sea experience pay more attention to manning and equipment issues 
than that of others. The main influence of collision/close-quarters situation put on 
individuals seems to be that it draws more attention from the experienced one to training 
and knowledge updating. 
  
8. A question 
In addition, one question arises from the comparisons between the researchers’ 
recommendations and the seafarers’ and experts’ views on human element involved in 
collision and countermeasures against these involvements. Since seafarers and those 
involved in maritime industry know very well the human elements involved and 
effective countermeasures against these human elements, why the maritime accidents 
including the collisions still occur at such a high rate? There should something behind 
this phenomenon. Deeper research work on this subject is needed. 
 
5.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter, a brief review has been devoted to the work done by researchers and 
IMO on countermeasures against impacts of human elements in maritime accidents. A 
specially designed investigation of the perspectives of relevant shipping personnel on 
countermeasures for reducing human element involvement in collisions is conducted by 
the questionnaire. It is commonly agreed that improving education and training, 
promoting research work and enforcing management both onboard ship and ashore are 
effective and practical measures for reducing impacts of human elements in maritime 
accidents including collisions.  
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CHAPTER 6   
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
6.1. Summary 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to identify the human elements involved in collision 
accidents at sea and the countermeasures for reducing the impacts of the human 
elements involved. For this purpose the following tasks have already been completed: 
• Studying the background literature, documents and reports relating to the human 
elements in maritime casualties especially in collisions at sea. Preparing 
information and materials needed for the research work. 
• Working out the research plan and determining the methods and approaches used 
in this research. 
• Establishing a classification for classifying and storing the human elements 
involved in the collisions. 
• Identifying the human elements involved in collisions at sea with determined 
methods.   
• Identifying effective and practical countermeasures for reducing the human 
elements involvement. 
• Providing recommendations on future work on reduction of the human elements 
involvement in collisions at sea. 
 
The methods used for this dissertation mainly consists of: Collecting actual human 
element data form current written accident reports; establishing a classification of the 
human element for collecting and storing the data picked up form the written reports; 
designing a questionnaire to collect the perspectives of marine safety related persons on 
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human elements involved in collisions; designing a mathematical model for analysing 
the data collected from the questionnaires. 
 
One hundred written accident reports have been retrieved and analysed. 387 out of 1000 
questionnaires circulated have been recovered. A fuzzy set model has been established 
and used in calculating the membership grade of human elements involvement based on 
the recovered questionnaires.  
 
The main findings and achievements are: 
• For identifying the human elements involved in collision at sea, a classification 
for collecting and storing the data relating to the human element involvement in 
marine collision accidents has been proposed. It consists of three subcategories: 
unsafe acts, underlying human elements, and external influencing factors. The 
application of this classification in this dissertation proves that it is practical and 
compatible, although there is still some room for improvement. 
• The written accident report is currently most useful and available source for 
identifying human elements involved in accidents, such as collisions, for it 
provides more detailed information regarding human performance in accidents 
which is valuable for searching the underlying human elements involved.  
• It is proved that a questionnaire is a valuable and practical method for human 
element research. The comparison between the data picked up form the written 
reports and the data calculated on the basis of the questionnaires demonstrates 
that human beings perspectives on involvement of human elements in collision 
are roughly consistent with the actual situation. The questionnaire cannot only 
provide the opinion of respondents about human elements but also reflects the 
respondents attitudes towards safety at sea, which is also valuable information 
for human element research. 
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• The perspectives of respondents with different backgrounds on involvements of 
human elements and countermeasures for reduction of those human elements are 
roughly identical with the actualities..  
• The most frequently involved unsafe acts in marine collisions are poor lookout 
and error of judgement. Other identified human elements include failure to 
comply with regulations, improper use of radar and ARPA, failure in 
communication, unsafe speed, and improper shiphandling and failure to comply 
with good seamanship. The underlying human elements behind these unsafe acts 
are experience/knowledge/training, communication difficulty, attention, failure 
and workload. The most involved external factors include manning, management, 
team working, safe culture, fairway, visibility and other traffic. 
• Nearly all aspects of the marine industry take education and training as a 
practical and effective way in fighting against involvement of human elements in 
maritime casualties including collisions. The key points lie in that education and 
training can not only promote the trainees competent levels but can also change 
their attitudes towards safety. Both of these effects can help to reduce the 
impacts of human elements in collisions at sea. 
• The prescriptive regulations have already played an important and active role in 
enhancing safety levels at sea, but to make more regulations for removal of 
human errors in the maritime industry is not a good and effective way. Improved 
training and education to make trainees be aware of the weakness of human 
beings and the inherent dangers posed by different situations maybe more helpful. 
• Improving management both on board ship and onshore is deemed as effective 
and practical for reduction of human elements. Onboard ships, bridge resource 
management or bridge team management should be improved. Ashore it is 
necessary to establish a quality system within the shipping company. The ISM 
Code has well coped with these requirements. 
 103
• Introducing the safety culture into the shipping industry is an effective way for 
reducing the human errors in collision accidents. Many collision cases show that 
not only the incompetent mariners but also the competent ones make mistakes 
during collision avoidance. It is difficult to explain the reason for lack of 
knowledge, experience or training; perhaps mariners attitudes towards the 
collision avoidance play a critical part in these cases. Establishing a safety 
culture within a company and an organization and having people change their 
attitudes towards safety are thus necessary. 
 
There are still some measures proposed by individuals and organizations, for 
instance, enforcing research on human elements in collisions, maintaining safe 
manning level, enhancing technical, research and training cooperation between 
maritime nations on human element issues may be used in fighting against the 
impacts of the human elements. Some of them need to be practiced; some of them 
need more research. 
 
6.2. Recommendations 
 
1. Current available accident reports have provided valuable information about accident 
events and direct causes leading to the accident. But most of them failed to provide 
more information about the underlying human element and the role the organization 
had played in accidents (Moore & Bea, 1993). The depth of investigation strongly 
depends on experience, knowledge, competence and even interests of the 
investigators. The formats of the reports are also varied from source to source. These 
problems bring about difficulties to the author in analysing the indirect causations of 
accidents. Fortunately, IMO (2000) provides a guideline for harmonizing the 
investigation of human factors in maritime casualties and incidents, which may 
improve the situation in future. The questions are: Will the guideline be fully 
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implemented by all maritime States? Is it effective to cover all kinds of maritime 
accidents? Will investigation in every maritime member states be competent enough 
to conduct the investigation? This is not sure. Therefore, it is recommended that: 
● trial application of the code and guidelines be conducted and its 
effectiveness assessed. If it is necessary, further amendments are needed.  
● the cooperation among all maritime nations in investigators training, 
information exchanging, technology and finance supporting be enhanced.   
  
2. There are many kinds of human element classifications available at present. Some of 
them are comparatively simple while others are too complicated; some of them are 
designed for universal use while others are just for oriented use (Moor&Bea,1993, 2-
4). It is of utmost importance that a practical and sound classification for human 
element research be developed. The classification should be easily understandable 
for not only the experts but also seafarers. The classification should be able to 
address the common human element involved in all marine accidents and specific 
human elements improved in special types of accidents such as collisions and 
groundings. 
 
3. The underlying human elements behind unsafe acts leading to collision are still 
uncertain for lack of information and research. There are two ways to deal with this 
issue: on the one hand, improving the investigation to get deeper into the accident; 
on the other hand, enhancing the research work on the issue. Since maritime safety 
as a research area is crosses disciplinary (Håvold, 2000, p.85; Larson, 1998), the 
research work demands the combined approaches of several disciplines: psychology, 
sociology, human resource, management, ergonomics, statistics and epidemiology. 
Since human elements nest on all levels and all aspects of the maritime industry 
(Rasmussen, 2000), the research work should not only focus on seafarers, all parties 
involved in shipping should be taken into account.  
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4. Since seafarers and those involved in shipping industry have well know the human 
elements involved in collision accidents and the countermeasures against the 
involvement of these human elements, it is necessary to explore the answer to the 
question why maritime accidents including collision still happen at a high rate. It 
needs the combining efforts of various parties.  
 
5. Although more effective and applicable measures need to be developed, the 
measures, for instance developing a safety culture, which has already been proved to 
be effective in reducing impacts of human elements in collisions should be actively 
applied now. It is recommended that all maritime safety related parties should try to 
seek ways to develop a new and positive safety culture and make it become an 
integral part of all personnel activities. 
 
People are the key to any real efforts to improve safety and pollution(ONeil quoted 
by Mejia, 2000). Identifying and reducing the impacts of human elements in maritime 
accidents including collisions at sea need all efforts of human being. 
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Appendix B 
 
Questionnaire 
Influences of Human Element on Collision at Sea 
 
 
23 March, 2001 
Dear Sir / Madam: 
 
Thank you very much for your attention to this questionnaire. 
 
According to some marine casualty statistics, more than 96 % of the marine accidents are 
connected with the human element. For safer shipping and cleaner seas, international 
organization such as IMO and various governments of maritime nations have already 
carried out a great mount of research and legislation work on this issue.  International 
conventions and codes such as STCW, SOLAS, and ISM are results of that work, which are 
playing important roles in reducing the impacts of human errors on marine casualties. 
Although safety situation at sea has improved recently, marine accidents still happen every 
year and human elements are involved in casualties repeatedly. Further research work is 
needed. 
 
In this research project, focus is placed on impacts of human element on marine casualties 
particularly on collision at sea. We need to identify the human factors that play a major role 
in collision accidents. We are requesting feedback to find out more effective measures and 
techniques to prevent the human error in collision avoidance from various maritime sectors 
worldwide. 
 
Your opinions on human elements involved in ship collision and your recommendations on 
reducing the impacts of human error on collision accidents will be very valuable and 
helpful to this project. We need your help very much. Please compete this questionnaire 
with your valuable experience and return to me by 6 April, 2001. You are not only helping 
this project, but also helping us better understand how to achieve safer shipping and cleaner 
sea. Thank you again. 
 
Liu zhengjiang 
MSEP 2001 
World Maritime University 
P.O. Box 500 
S-201 24 
Malmö, Sweden 
E-mail: s01025@wmu.se, or liuzhengjiang@hotmail.com 
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Questionnaire Influences of Human Element on Collision at Sea 
 
Part 1.   Respondent’s Personal Particulars 
 
Nationality _______________Language:   □ English       □ Non-English 
(e.g. Chinese, American, Swedes, Danish, etc.) 
 
Age :  □ < 20 □ 20 - 30 □ 30 - 40 □ 40 - 50 □50 - 60 □ >60 
 
Occupation: □ Staff of shipping company □ Seafarer 
 
                      □Administration Officer (government) □ Staff of port 
 
                      □ Other:__________________ 
Your job relates to:   □ safety          □economy            □ other 
 
Education level: □ Postgraduate □ University /Undergraduate 
 
                            □ College Degree □ Other:__________________ 
 
Competence level: (for seafarers only) 
 □ Chief officer □ navigational watch officer 
□ chief engineer □second engineer □ engineering watch officer 
□ Master □ rating for engineering watch 
 
Sea experience:(if have) 
 
□ <1 year □ 1- 5 years □ 5- 10 years □ > 10 years 
 
Collision /close quarters experience : □ yes                             □  no 
 
Part 2 Most Probably Incidents 
(Check one of the following which you think has the highest occurrence rate) 
 
□ Collision/Contacts □ Capsizing □ Sinking/Foundering 
 
□ Fire and Explosion □ Grounding □ damage Machinery  
 
□ Other:_________________________ 
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Part 3 Human Elements Involved in Collision at Sea 
(Circle a proper number following each item according to your opinion.) 
1-very unlikely involved  2-unlikely involved  3-likely involved  4-very likely involved 
 
Human Element very-unlikely unlikely likely very-likely 
Error in judgment 1 2 3 4 
Incompetence 1 2 3 4 
Improper lookout  1 2 3 4 
Use improper speed  1 2 3 4 
Failure to take early action 1 2 3 4 
Failure to comply with Regulations  1 2 3 4 
Failure in good seamanship 1 2 3 4 
Mismanoeuvre the ship 1 2 3 4 
Misuse of radar and ARPA 1 2 3 4 
Negligence or misconduct 1 2 3 4 
Communication problem 1 2 3 4 
Anxiety and fear 1 2 3 4 
Overloading 1 2 3 4 
Fatigue 1 2 3 4 
Management problem 1 2 3 4 
Violation  1 2 3 4 
Drug and alcohol 1 2 3 4 
Mental state 1 2 3 4 
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Questionnaire Influences of Human Element on Collision at Sea 
 
Part 4  Measures Lessening the Influence of Human Elements 
(Check the item you agree. Please make more recommendations and comments if you 
like.) 
 
□ Enforce training (seafarers and shore staff) on both skill and knowledge 
 
□ Upgrade and update the relevant knowledge (nautical and management) in time 
 
□ Enhance the international cooperation on technical (e.g. training, research work) 
issues 
 
□ Amend, establish and put in order the international conventions and national 
legislation 
 
□ improve the management both ashore and on board ship 
 
□ Improve ship design 
 
□ Equip the ship with more automated instruments and systems 
 
□ Promote and support research work on human elements 
 
□ other:__________________________________________________ 
 
Your recommendations or comments: 
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Appendix C 
Experts and Seafarers’ Views on The Involvement of Human 
Elements in Collision at Sea 
 
Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved (Chinese) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 17 85 141 51 0.69
Error of Judgment 0 27 144 124 0.83
Improper Lookout 2 24 131 136 0.84
Unsafe Speed 15 74 149 56 0.71
Late Action 1 21 157 114 0.83
Failure to Comply with Regulation 4 56 170 60 0.75
Improper ship handling 6 35 174 77 0.78
Misuse Radar and ARPA 15 77 165 36 0.69
Failure to Comply with GS. 13 67 183 31 0.70
Communication Problem 20 106 140 22 0.64
Mental State 22 85 124 43 0.67
Anxiety and Fear 24 99 148 19 0.64
Health Unfitness 44 139 89 7 0.55
Overloading 17 110 120 42 0.66
Fatigue 7 38 162 75 0.77
Management Problem 17 73 151 50 0.70
Violation 203 65 14 8 0.35
Drug and Alcohol 2 7 3 0 0.52
 
Note: 
 
GS:  Good Seamanship 
Ad.O.: Administration officer 
CQS: Close-quarters Situation 
C.M.: Chief mate 
N.M. : Navigation officer 
Developed N.: Developed nationalities including west European and American. 
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Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved ( developed nationalities) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 2 5 13 3 0.68
Error of Judgment 1 1 5 15 0.89
Improper Lookout 2 1 9 11 0.82
Unsafe Speed 3 5 9 5 0.68
Late Action 0 1 12 10 0.85
Failure to Comply with Regulation 1 2 11 7 0.79
improper ship handling 2 5 10 5 0.70
Misuse Radar and ARPA 1 3 13 4 0.74
Failure to Comply with GS: 4 8 6 4 0.61
Communication Problem 0 5 10 6 0.76
Mental State 4 7 5 6 0.65
Anxiety and Fear 5 13 2 1 0.49
Health Unfitness 4 13 2 1 0.50
Overloading 3 8 6 4 0.63
Fatigue 0 4 10 9 0.80
Management Problem 3 3 13 4 0.70
Violation 15 6 0 1 0.35
Drug and Alcohol 5 7 5 2 0.55
 
Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved ( other nationalities) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 6 16 33 10 0.68
Error of Judgment 3 3 32 27 0.82
Improper Lookout 2 6 34 23 0.80
Unsafe Speed 2 13 37 13 0.73
Late Action 0 5 32 29 0.84
Failure to Comply with Regulation 2 11 33 18 0.76
Improper ship handling 1 16 34 14 0.73
Misuse Radar and ARPA 1 25 38 3 0.66
Failure to Comply with GS 5 12 27 19 0.74
Communication Problem 2 12 36 14 0.74
Mental State 0 14 34 16 0.76
Anxiety and Fear 7 26 20 9 0.63
Health Unfitness 14 21 16 1 0.52
Overloading 6 23 17 12 0.65
Fatigue 1 7 31 24 0.81
Management Problem 5 23 28 8 0.65
Violation 34 20 7 2 0.41
Drug and Alcohol 9 10 24 9 0.66
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Comparison of Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved (Based on Nationalities) 
 Chinese Developed N.  Other Nationalities 
Incompetence 0.69 0.68 0.68  
Error of Judgment 0.83 0.89 0.82  
Improper Lookout 0.84 0.82 0.8  
Unsafe Speed 0.71 0.68 0.73  
Late Action 0.83 0.85 0.84  
Failure to Comply with Regulation 0.75 0.79 0.76  
Improper ship handling 0.78 0.7 0.73  
Misuse Radar and ARPA 0.69 0.74 0.66  
Failure to Comply with GS. 0.7 0.61 0.74  
Communication Problem 0.64 0.76 0.74  
Mental State 0.67 0.65 0.76  
Anxiety and Fear 0.64 0.49 0.63  
Health Unfitness 0.55 0.5 0.52  
Overloading 0.66 0.63 0.65  
Fatigue 0.77 0.8 0.81  
Management Problem 0.7 0.7 0.65  
Violation 0.35 0.35 0.41  
Drug and Alcohol 0.52 0.55 0.66  
 
Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved seafarers) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 20 71 104 32 0.66
Error of Judgment 4 25 104 93 0.82
Improper Lookout 5 22 101 100 0.82
Unsafe Speed 16 64 100 44 0.69
Late Action 3 19 106 91 0.83
Failure to Comply with Regulation 4 50 130 43 0.73
Improper ship handling 9 31 124 58 0.76
Misuse Radar and ARPA 13 64 124 22 0.67
Failure to Comply with GS. 10 60 125 28 0.69
Communication Problem 18 85 94 25 0.64
Mental State 18 54 76 33 0.67
Anxiety and Fear 24 74 105 18 0.63
Health Unfitness 39 94 58 10 0.55
Overloading 16 81 86 43 0.67
Fatigue 8 31 112 70 0.78
Management Problem 18 68 102 35 0.67
Violation 162 47 11 8 0.35
Drug and Alcohol 9 6 5 4 0.54
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Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved (Maritime Administrators) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 5 21 40 16 0.70
Error of Judgment 1 4 40 39 0.85
Improper Lookout 1 3 36 34 0.85
Unsafe Speed 1 11 50 20 0.77
Late Action 0 3 39 43 0.87
Failure to Comply with Regulation 0 13 46 23 0.78
Improper ship handling 1 16 47 21 0.76
Misuse Radar and ARPA 4 25 43 10 0.68
Failure to Comply with GS. 6 17 38 18 0.72
Communication Problem 6 22 40 11 0.68
Mental State 3 14 21 7 0.68
Anxiety and Fear 10 37 26 8 0.60
Health Unfitness 18 39 23 3 0.53
Overloading 6 42 21 10 0.61
Fatigue 0 13 44 25 0.79
Management Problem 3 17 47 17 0.73
Violation 51 25 4 1 0.36
Drug and Alcohol 7 13 12 5 0.60
 
Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved (Staff of Shipping Company) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 1 2 4 3 0.73
Error of Judgment 1 1 7 2 0.73
Improper Lookout 0 1 3 7 0.89
Unsafe Speed 0 5 5 1 0.66
Late Action 0 1 8 2 0.77
Failure to Comply with Regulation 0 1 6 5 0.83
Improper ship handling 0 4 5 4 0.75
Misuse Radar and ARPA 0 3 7 1 0.70
Failure to Comply with GS. 0 3 6 1 0.70
Communication Problem 1 4 7 0 0.63
Mental State 0 3 3 0 0.63
Anxiety and Fear 2 5 3 0 0.53
Health Unfitness 2 6 0 0 0.44
Overloading 2 6 1 1 0.53
Fatigue 0 3 7 1 0.70
Management Problem 1 4 4 1 0.63
Violation 7 3 0 0 0.33
Drug and Alcohol 0 2 2 1 0.70
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Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved ( Other Personnel's) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 2 13 39 21 0.76
Error of Judgment 0 5 34 37 0.86
Improper Lookout 1 4 39 31 0.83
Unsafe Speed 3 14 46 12 0.72
Late Action 0 4 46 24 0.82
Failure to Comply with Regulation 1 8 46 19 0.78
Improper ship handling 1 7 48 18 0.78
Misuse Radar and ARPA 2 14 50 26 0.77
Failure to Comply with GS. 2 8 52 10 0.74
Communication Problem 1 16 49 11 0.73
Mental State 0 14 27 5 0.70
Anxiety and Fear 7 22 41 5 0.65
Health Unfitness 5 38 30 1 0.59
Overloading 3 25 38 8 0.67
Fatigue 0 11 39 24 0.79
Management Problem 4 13 42 16 0.73
Violation 36 26 8 5 0.44
Drug and Alcohol 4 14 8 3 0.59
 
Comparison of Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved (Based on Occupation) 
 Seafarers Ad.O   SSC Other   
Incompetence 0.66 0.7 0.73 0.76  
Error of Judgment 0.81 0.85 0.73 0.86  
Improper Lookout 0.84 0.85 0.89 0.83  
Unsafe Speed 0.69 0.77 0.66 0.72  
Late Action 0.83 0.87 0.77 0.82  
Failure to Comply with Regulation 0.73 0.78 0.83 0.78  
Improper ship handling 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.78  
Misuse Radar and ARPA 0.67 0.68 0.7 0.77  
Failure to Comply with GS. 0.69 0.72 0.7 0.74  
Communication Problem 0.64 0.68 0.64 0.73  
Mental State 0.67 0.68 0.64 0.7  
Anxiety and Fear 0.63 0.6 0.53 0.65  
Health Unfitness 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.59  
Overloading 0.67 0.61 0.53 0.67  
Fatigue 0.78 0.79 0.7 0.79  
Management Problem 0.67 0.73 0.63 0.73  
Violation 0.35 0.36 0.32 0.44  
Drug and Alcohol 0.54 0.6 0.7 0.59  
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Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved ( Post Graduates) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 1 15 40 11 0.73
Error of Judgment 0 5 42 30 0.83
Improper Lookout 0 3 39 26 0.83
Unsafe Speed 0 14 43 10 0.74
Late Action 0 5 38 24 0.82
Failure to Comply with Regulation 0 5 42 20 0.81
Improper ship handling 0 10 46 12 0.76
Misuse Radar and ARPA 1 25 39 13 0.71
Failure to Comply with GS. 1 13 43 9 0.73
Communication Problem 0 16 45 6 0.71
Mental State 1 8 18 3 0.69
Anxiety and Fear 5 26 32 3 0.63
Health Unfitness 8 36 23 0 0.56
Overloading 4 27 28 5 0.63
Fatigue 0 8 42 17 0.78
Management Problem 1 16 42 7 0.71
Violation 33 24 6 2 0.41
Drug and Alcohol 5 17 13 2 0.58
 
Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved( University ) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 5 33 51 24 0.71
Error of Judgment 2 10 44 57 0.85
Improper Lookout 3 5 52 53 0.84
Unsafe Speed 4 20 64 25 0.74
Late Action 0 10 57 47 0.83
Failure to Comply with Regulation 1 18 62 31 0.77
Improper ship handling 1 20 52 30 0.77
Misuse Radar and ARPA 4 25 66 18 0.72
Failure to Comply with GS. 3 22 67 18 0.73
Communication Problem 8 31 58 16 0.68
Mental State 3 77 36 7 0.60
Anxiety and Fear 14 39 48 10 0.62
Health Unfitness 17 54 27 3 0.54
Overloading 10 46 39 13 0.63
Fatigue 3 17 712 22 0.75
Management Problem 11 26 56 20 0.69
Violation 71 33 6 2 0.36
Drug and Alcohol 3 6 10 6 0.69
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Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved (College ) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 9 24 35 17 0.68
Error of Judgment 2 6 41 36 0.83
Improper Lookout 3 10 34 39 0.82
Unsafe Speed 6 21 39 15 0.69
Late Action 2 3 40 41 0.85
Failure to Comply with Regulation 2 13 51 17 0.75
Improper ship handling 7 12 42 20 0.73
Misuse Radar and ARPA 7 21 44 9 0.67
Failure to Comply with GS 16 23 39 13 0.63
Communication Problem 4 29 35 13 0.68
Mental State 7 17 20 12 0.67
Anxiety and Fear 10 29 37 6 0.62
Health Unfitness 13 38 17 4 0.54
Overloading 5 36 26 15 0.66
Fatigue 1 12 37 33 0.81
Management Problem 3 22 38 19 0.72
Violation 55 19 4 4 0.37
Drug and Alcohol 6 4 3 2 0.52
 
Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved(Vacational School and other ) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 10 34 62 12 0.66
Error of Judgment 0 11 42 43 0.83
Improper Lookout 0 12 51 53 0.84
Unsafe Speed 10 38 50 23 0.68
Late Action 1 9 64 42 0.82
Failure to Comply with Regulation 2 34 51 30 0.73
Improper ship handling 2 14 72 31 0.78
Misuse Radar and ARPA 5 33 61 15 0.69
Failure to Comply with GS. 2 32 68 12 0.70
Communication Problem 11 46 50 7 0.62
Mental State 11 33 49 21 0.68
Anxiety and Fear 18 42 20 10 0.56
Health Unfitness 25 47 41 2 0.54
Overloading 6 36 50 24 0.70
Fatigue 4 10 67 37 0.79
Management Problem 9 34 60 16 0.67
Violation 92 16 5 3 0.33
Drug and Alcohol 3 2 4 1 0.58
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Comparison of Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved( Based on Education Level) 
 
Post 
Graduate 
Universit
y 
Colleg
e Vocational and other 
Incompetence 0.73 0.71 0.68 0.66  
Error of Judgment 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.83  
Improper Lookout 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.84  
Unsafe Speed 0.73 0.74 0.69 0.68  
Late Action 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.82  
Failure to Comply with Regulation 0.81 0.77 0.75 0.73  
Improper ship handling 0.76 0.77 0.73 0.78  
Misuse Radar and ARPA 0.71 0.72 0.67 0.69  
Failure to Comply with GS. 0.73 0.72 0.63 0.7  
Communication Problem 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.62  
Mental State 0.69 0.6 0.67 0.68  
Anxiety and Fear 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.56  
Health Unfitness 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.54  
Overloading 0.63 0.63 0.66 0.7  
Fatigue 0.78 0.75 0.81 0.79  
Management Problem 0.71 0.69 0.72 0.67  
Violation 0.41 0.36 0.37 0.33  
Drug and Alcohol 0.58 0.69 0.51 0.58  
 
Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved( No Sea Experience) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 1 8 14 4 0.69
Error of Judgment 0 1 14 13 0.86
Improper Lookout 0 3 13 11 0.82
Unsafe Speed 0 6 17 4 0.73
Late Action 0 4 13 10 0.81
Failure to Comply with Regulation 0 3 14 10 0.81
Improper ship handling 0 6 14 7 0.76
Misuse Radar and ARPA 1 8 15 3 0.69
Failure to Comply with GS. 1 3 15 7 0.77
Communication Problem 2 3 15 8 0.76
Mental State 0 1 3 1 0.75
Anxiety and Fear 3 12 8 4 0.62
Health Unfitness 3 11 12 1 0.60
Overloading 3 12 11 1 0.59
Fatigue 0 3 13 11 0.82
Management Problem 2 7 14 4 0.69
Violation 6 16 4 1 0.50
Drug and Alcohol 2 2 7 6 0.75
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Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved( Less than 5 years) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 7 29 60 18 0.70
Error of Judgment 1 10 53 55 0.84
Improper Lookout 2 9 45 62 0.85
Unsafe Speed 4 26 61 29 0.74
Late Action 1 14 57 36 0.80
Failure to Comply with Regulation 2 26 60 29 0.75
Improper ship handling 3 21 75 27 0.75
Misuse Radar and ARPA 7 37 63 10 0.66
Failure to Comply with GS. 10 27 68 15 0.68
Communication Problem 10 46 51 7 0.62
Mental State 8 36 37 8 0.63
Anxiety and Fear 12 50 55 7 0.61
Health Unfitness 17 56 30 2 0.54
Overloading 5 47 42 23 0.68
Fatigue 2 12 66 39 0.80
Management Problem 9 35 52 14 0.66
Violation 89 25 2 2 0.32
Drug and Alcohol 1 7 6 2 0.64
 
Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved(5-10 years) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 10 32 51 25 0.69
Error of Judgment 0 12 51 51 0.84
Improper Lookout 0 7 52 56 0.86
Unsafe Speed 11 28 54 20 0.68
Late Action 0 2 62 48 0.85
Failure to Comply with Regulation 1 19 64 31 0.77
Improper ship handling 2 14 63 32 0.78
Misuse Radar and ARPA 4 23 73 14 0.71
Failure to Comply with GS. 3 25 64 19 0.72
Communication Problem 8 39 50 16 0.66
Mental State 11 24 42 18 0.68
Anxiety and Fear 10 38 49 10 0.64
Health Unfitness 15 56 32 3 0.55
Overloading 9 44 41 17 0.65
Fatigue 1 21 54 37 0.78
Management Problem 5 30 60 27 0.72
Violation 81 17 9 7 0.37
Drug and Alcohol 0 4 6 3 0.73
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Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved( More than 10 years) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 7 32 59 14 0.68
Error of Judgment 3 8 57 43 0.82
Improper Lookout 4 9 58 40 0.80
Unsafe Speed 5 30 57 18 0.70
Late Action 2 7 61 42 0.82
Failure to Comply with Regulation 1 19 71 16 0.74
Improper ship handling 5 25 63 26 0.73
Misuse Radar and ARPA 6 27 58 10 0.68
Failure to Comply with GS. 8 30 60 12 0.67
Communication Problem 2 32 60 13 0.70
Mental State 4 18 35 15 0.71
Anxiety and Fear 11 33 54 8 0.64
Health Unfitness 26 35 31 3 0.53
Overloading 7 37 47 15 0.67
Fatigue 5 11 64 31 0.77
Management Problem 8 26 64 13 0.68
Violation 70 30 6 1 0.36
Drug and Alcohol 11 7 8 1 0.49
 
Comparison of Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved (Based on Sea Experience) 
 No S.E. < 5 years 5-10 ys >10 ys 
Incompetence 0.69 0.7 0.69 0.68  
Error of Judgment 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.82  
Improper Lookout 0.82 0.85 0.86 0.8  
Unsafe Speed 0.73 0.74 0.68 0.7  
Late Action 0.81 0.8 0.85 0.82  
Failure to Comply with Regulation 0.81 0.75 0.77 0.74  
Improper ship handling 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.73  
Misuse Radar and ARPA 0.69 0.66 0.71 0.68  
Failure to Comply with GS 0.77 0.68 0.72 0.67  
Communication Problem 0.76 0.62 0.66 0.7  
Mental State 0.75 0.63 0.68 0.71  
Anxiety and Fear 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.64  
Health Unfitness 0.6 0.54 0.55 0.53  
Overloading 0.59 0.68 0.65 0.67  
Fatigue 0.82 0.8 0.78 0.77  
Management Problem 0.89 0.66 0.72 0.68  
Violation 0.5 0.32 0.37 0.36  
Drug and Alcohol 0.75 0.64 0.73 0.49  
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Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved (Master) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 1 17 33 13 0.73
Error of Judgment 1 4 26 33 0.86
Improper Lookout 2 2 30 31 0.85
Unsafe Speed 3 9 39 13 0.74
Late Action 0 2 37 26 0.84
Failure to Comply with Regulation 1 13 32 16 0.75
Improper ship handling 2 13 31 17 0.75
Misuse Radar and ARPA 4 16 36 8 0.69
Failure to Comply with GS. 6 14 30 13 0.70
Communication Problem 2 21 31 10 0.69
Mental State 3 9 19 3 0.66
Anxiety and Fear 7 24 27 5 0.62
Health Unfitness 10 31 16 1 0.53
Overloading 6 27 21 9 0.63
Fatigue 7 10 33 19 0.73
Management Problem 4 14 37 9 0.70
Violation 43 16 3 2 0.36
Drug and Alcohol 9 8 6 12 0.65
 
Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved (Chief Mate) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 2 12 15 7 0.69
Error of Judgment 1 3 9 23 0.88
Improper Lookout 1 1 11 23 0.89
Unsafe Speed 2 10 14 10 0.72
Late Action 1 2 16 18 0.84
Failure to Comply with Regulation 0 6 19 11 0.78
Improper ship handling 1 5 15 15 0.81
Misuse Radar and ARPA 0 7 23 6 0.74
Failure to Comply with GS. 0 6 20 9 0.77
Communication Problem 1 11 17 7 0.71
Mental State 1 6 13 4 0.71
Anxiety and Fear 2 14 16 4 0.65
Health Unfitness 8 15 8 1 0.52
Overloading 1 13 15 7 0.69
Fatigue 2 4 19 11 0.77
Management Problem 4 9 13 9 0.69
Violation 24 7 2 2 0.37
Drug and Alcohol 0 3 1 3 0.75
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Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved (Navigation Mate) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 5 26 45 18 0.70
Error of Judgment 1 5 44 45 0.85
Improper Lookout 2 4 39 50 0.86
Unsafe Speed 9 31 36 17 0.66
Late Action 1 7 45 42 0.84
Failure to Comply with Regulation 3 11 62 17 0.75
Improper ship handling 0 8 59 26 0.80
Misuse Radar and ARPA 4 27 51 16 0.70
Failure to Comply with GS. 3 18 63 9 0.71
Communication Problem 4 32 52 5 0.66
Mental State 3 28 38 13 0.69
Anxiety and Fear 11 28 43 9 0.64
Health Unfitness 15 53 11 5 0.52
Overloading 7 40 29 16 0.65
Fatigue 4 9 46 26 0.78
Management Problem 10 20 40 22 0.70
Violation 64 20 5 2 0.35
Drug and Alcohol 0 0 3 2 0.85
 
Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved (Other personnel) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 17 45 90 22 0.67
Error of Judgment 1 19 93 61 0.81
Improper Lookout 1 20 86 54 0.80
Unsafe Speed 5 38 99 32 0.73
Late Action 0 15 92 63 0.82
Failure to Comply with Regulation 1 37 93 39 0.75
Improper ship handling 7 30 101 34 0.74
Misuse Radar and ARPA 9 46 99 13 0.67
Failure to Comply with GS. 13 45 95 21 0.68
Communication Problem 15 56 76 20 0.65
Mental State 13 39 46 22 0.66
Anxiety and Fear 16 54 79 10 0.63
Health Unfitness 28 65 65 2 0.56
Overloading 10 60 68 28 0.67
Fatigue 0 24 97 52 0.79
Management Problem 6 51 96 19 0.69
Violation 11 35 11 1 0.51
Drug and Alcohol 7 9 19 6 0.65
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Comparison of Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved Based on Competence Level 
 Master C.M. N.M. Other  
Incompetence 0.73 0.69 0.7 0.68  
Error of Judgment 0.86 0.88 0.85 0.81  
Improper Lookout 0.85 0.89 0.86 0.8  
Unsafe Speed 0.74 0.72 0.66 0.73  
Late Action 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.82  
Failure to Comply with Regulation 0.75 0.78 0.75 0.75  
Improper ship handling 0.75 0.81 0.8 0.74  
Misuse Radar and ARPA 0.69 0.74 0.7 0.67  
Failure to Comply with GS. 0.7 0.77 0.71 0.68  
Communication Problem 0.69 0.71 0.66 0.65  
Mental State 0.66 0.71 0.69 0.66  
Anxiety and Fear 0.62 0.65 0.64 0.63  
Health Unfitness 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.56  
Overloading 0.63 0.69 0.65 0.67  
Fatigue 0.73 0.77 0.78 0.79  
Management Problem 0.7 0.69 0.7 0.69  
Violation 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.51  
Drug and Alcohol 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.65  
 
Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved ( No Collision/CQS Experience ) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 21 72 114 38 0.67
Error of Judgment 4 27 118 95 0.81
Improper Lookout 5 25 110 104 0.82
Unsafe Speed 11 68 120 45 0.70
Late Action 0 21 126 97 0.83
Failure to Comply with Regulation 3 51 126 60 0.75
Improper ship handling 7 43 133 68 0.76
Misuse Radar and ARPA 7 78 130 25 0.68
Failure to Comply with GS. 14 63 126 40 0.70
Communication Problem 17 82 107 31 0.66
Mental State 12 58 61 29 0.67
Anxiety and Fear 19 100 98 22 0.63
Health Unfitness 37 105 72 5 0.55
Overloading 19 86 86 43 0.66
Fatigue 5 31 127 80 0.79
Management Problem 18 70 118 35 0.68
Violation 160 60 12 7 0.36
Drug and Alcohol 7 14 20 11 0.67
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Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved( With Collision/CQS Experience ) 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Membership 
Grade 
Incompetence 4 34 73 26 0.72
Error of Judgment 0 4 62 71 0.87
Improper Lookout 1 6 64 66 0.86
Unsafe Speed 9 24 75 29 0.73
Late Action 1 6 75 56 0.84
Failure to Comply with Regulation 4 19 88 25 0.75
Improper ship handling 2 13 85 38 0.79
Misuse Radar and ARPA 10 27 84 18 0.70
Failure to Comply with GS. 8 24 90 14 0.70
Communication Problem 5 41 79 11 0.68
Mental State 10 27 63 14 0.68
Anxiety and Fear 17 38 72 7 0.63
Health Unfitness 25 68 35 4 0.53
Overloading 7 55 57 15 0.65
Fatigue 3 18 76 28 0.76
Management Problem 7 34 74 27 0.71
Violation 92 31 9 3 0.36
Drug and Alcohol 7 3 9 9 0.68
Comparison of Membership Grade of Human Elements Involved(collision/CQS Experience)  
 No Yes    
Incompetence 0.67 0.72    
Error of Judgment 0.81 0.87    
Improper Lookout 0.82 0.86    
Unsafe Speed 0.7 0.73    
Late Action 0.83 0.84    
Failure to Comply with Regulation 0.75 0.75    
Improper ship handling 0.76 0.79    
Misuse Radar and ARPA 0.68 0.7    
Failure to Comply with GS. 0.7 0.7    
Communication Problem 0.66 0.68    
Mental State 0.67 0.68    
Anxiety and Fear 0.63 0.63    
Health Unfitness 0.55 0.53    
Overloading 0.66 0.65    
Fatigue 0.79 0.76    
Management Problem 0.68 0.71    
Violation 0.36 0.36    
Drug and Alcohol 0.67 0.68    
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Appendix D 
Expert and Seafarer Views on Countermeasures against the Involvement of 
Human Elements in Collision at Sea 
 
Experts and seafarer’s view on assumed measure 
Assumed measures Percentage of confirm 
Enforce training and education 82 
Update knowledge  66 
Cooperation on technical issues 54 
Legislation 42 
Improve management 68 
Improve ship design 31 
Automated equipment 51 
Safe manning  63 
Quality system 59 
enforce research work 69 
 
Comparison of views on assumed measures based on nationality 
Assumed measures Percentage of respondents with "yes"  
 Chinese Developed N. Other  
Enforce training and education 84 70 79 
Update knowledge  65 65 73 
Cooperation on technical issues 53 43 59 
Legislation 44 30 39 
Improve management 67 70 71 
Improve ship design 30 30 39 
Automated equipment 57 22 35 
Safe manning  61 61 73 
Quality system 56 70 71 
Enforce research work 68 74 74 
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Comparison of views on assumed measures based on occupation 
Assumed measures Percentage of respondents with "yes" 
 Seafarers SSC. Ad. O. Other 
Enforce training and education 83 83 93 77 
Update knowledge  67 75 73 68 
Cooperation on technical issues 59 42 59 43 
Legislation 51 25 33 32 
Improve management 72 83 78 61 
Improve ship design 38 8 23 33 
Automated equipment 66 33 39 35 
Safe manning  70 33 59 43 
Quality system 62 58 62 44 
Enforce research work 69 75 76 72 
 
Comparison of views on assumed measures based on education level  
Assumed measures Percentage of respondents with "yes" 
 Post graduate University College Other 
Enforce training and education 86 87 74 83 
Update knowledge  77 72 57 62 
Cooperation on technical issues 43 55 52 60 
Legislation 30 44 44 47 
Improve management 68 72 63 68 
Improve ship design 26 35 27 32 
Automated equipment 55 51 34 68 
Safe manning  54 61 58 69 
Quality system 58 59 57 62 
Enforce research work 48 72 73 59 
Comparison of views on assumed measures based on competence level 
Assumed measures Percentage of respondents with "yes" 
 Master Chief mate Nav. mate Other 
Enforce training and education 74 79 90 75 
Update knowledge  67 72 66 60 
Cooperation on technical issues 47 59 58 49 
Legislation 36 44 43 42 
Improve management 59 41 80 67 
Improve ship design 29 23 43 28 
Automated equipment 42 58 60 48 
Safe manning  53 59 56 52 
Quality system 56 38 60 58 
Enforce research work 73 43 74 59 
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Comparison of views on assumed measures based on sea experience 
Assumed measures Percentage of respondents with "yes" 
 No Less than 5 years 5-10 years > 10 years 
Enforce training and education 81 77 81 81 
Update knowledge  78 60 65 67 
Cooperation on technical 
issues 44 55 54 52 
Legislation 38 39 44 41 
Improve management 75 65 70 64 
Improve ship design 17 34 30 27 
Automated equipment 28 55 57 47 
Safe manning  56 65 57 60 
Quality system 50 58 54 61 
Enforce research work 66 64 70 69 
 
Comparison of views on assumed measures based on experience of collision/close-quarters situation  
Assumed measures Percentage of respondents with "yes" 
 Yes No 
Enforce training and education 87 80 
Update knowledge  70 67 
Cooperation on technical issues 49 57 
Legislation 37 50 
Improve management 67 69 
Improve ship design 22 36 
Automated equipment 46 54 
Safe manning  55 63 
Quality system 57 61 
Enforce research work 67 69 
 
